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ABSTRACT 
Research on opportunity recognition and entrepreneurial cognition suggests that 
entrepreneurs are likely to use and potentially benefit from heuristics (Baron, 1998, 2004; 
Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Some heuristics, particularly well-refined and accurate prototypes, 
may be valuable to entrepreneurs in recognizing opportunities (Baron, 2004). I seek, however, to 
consider how other types of heuristics that lead to irrational, biased, and inaccurate judgments 
(e.g., the betrayal heuristic) relate to opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004; Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993). I specifically consider the underlying causal process through which the use of 
these types of heuristics diminishes the ability to recognize opportunities. I posit that these 
heuristics reduce the ability to recognize opportunities by causing entrepreneurs to consider less 
information regarding potential opportunities. Further, I propose two individual differences that 
allow certain entrepreneurs to mitigate the negative effect that these bias-causing heuristics have 
on entrepreneurs’ ability of form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity.  
I test my theory with two experimental designs that use a product from a technology 
transfer office that has been licensed by entrepreneurs and applied to a real-world market. This 
allows me to isolate the underlying variables of interest and to affix my theorizing to a well-
documented phenomenon (the licensing and application of tech-transfer technology/products by 
entrepreneurs) (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; Mowery, 2004; Shane, 2001). Results show that 
some heuristic may cause individuals to consider less information about an opportunity, which 
reduces their likelihood of forming an opportunity recognition belief. Post hoc analyses suggest 
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that this indirect effect may be conditional on how reflective an individual is and that 
entrepreneurs may be more reflective than non-entrepreneurs.   
The major contribution of this dissertation is to examine the theoretical underpinnings as 
to why certain types of heuristics inhibit entrepreneurs from forming the belief that they have 
recognized an opportunity. Specifically, I suggest and show that bias-causing heuristics reduce 
the amount of information that entrepreneurs consider about an opportunity and, as such, inhibit 
opportunity recognition beliefs. Second, I provide some support for the notion that reflective 
individuals are more likely to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity because 
they consider more information about the opportunity when they initially rely on a bias-causing 
heuristic. Lastly, this dissertation provides initial support for the notion that entrepreneurs may 
be more reflective than non-entrepreneurs. Overall, I hope to point out that although a heuristic-
dependent processing style has been shown to be beneficial with regard to opportunity 
recognition (Baron, 2004), the failure to consider the downside of certain heuristics and benefits 
related to overcoming these heuristics may limit our understanding of the opportunity 
recognition process. 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my loving wife Jessica, who has fully supported me in this 
endeavor and in life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ x 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xi 
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Theory and Hypotheses........................................................................................................... 6 
Opportunity Recognition Belief .......................................................................................... 7 
Heuristics .......................................................................................................................... 11 
Bias-causing heuristic ................................................................................................... 12 
Bias-causing heuristics and the decision to consider additional information ............... 16 
Bias-causing heuristics and the decision to consider less information ......................... 18 
The Consideration of Information and Opportunity Recognition Belief .......................... 19 
Individual Differences That May Help Individuals Overcome Heuristic-Based Biases .. 20 
The need for cognition .................................................................................................. 24 
Entrepreneurial alertness ............................................................................................... 26 
Method .................................................................................................................................. 29 
Study 1 .............................................................................................................................. 29 
Procedure for collection 1 of Study 1 ........................................................................... 30 
Sample for Collection 1 of Study 1........................................................................... 31 
vi 
 
Procedure for Collection 1 ........................................................................................ 31 
Sample for Collection 2 of Study 1........................................................................... 34 
Procedure for Collection 2 ........................................................................................ 35 
Measures for Collection 1 and Collection 2 of Study 1 ............................................ 35 
Amount of information considered ....................................................................... 35 
Opportunity Recognition Belief ............................................................................ 36 
Results for Pretests ........................................................................................................ 36 
Results for Study 1 ........................................................................................................ 38 
Results for Study 1 Collection 1 ................................................................................... 38 
Results for Study 1 Collection 2 ................................................................................... 40 
Discussion of Study 1 ................................................................................................... 41 
Study 2 .............................................................................................................................. 42 
Sample for Study 2........................................................................................................ 42 
Procedure for Study 2 ................................................................................................... 44 
Measures for Study 2 .................................................................................................... 45 
Entrepreneurial alertness ........................................................................................... 45 
Need for cognition .................................................................................................... 45 
Results for Study 2 ........................................................................................................ 46 
vii 
 
Discussion of Study 2 ................................................................................................... 47 
Post Hoc Analysis ............................................................................................................. 48 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 52 
Theoretical Implications ................................................................................................... 52 
Practical Implications........................................................................................................ 56 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions .................................................. 57 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 59 
APPENDIX A:  MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, RELIABILITIES AND 
CORRELATIONS FOR STUDY 1 AND STUDY 2 ................................................................... 60 
APPENDIX B:  POISSON REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 1 OF STUDY 1 .. 62 
APPENDIX C:  BOOTSTRAPPING ANALYSES RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 1 OF 
STUDY 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 64 
APPENDIX D:  REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 2 OF STUDY 1 ................... 66 
APPENDIX E: ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 1 
OF STUDY 1 ................................................................................................................................ 68 
APPENDIX F:  BOOTSTRAPPING ANALYSES RESULTS FOR STUDY 2 ......................... 70 
APPENDIX G:  MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, RELIABILITIES AND 
CORRELATIONS FOR THE POST HOC SAMPLE.................................................................. 72 
viii 
 
APPENDIX H:  POST HOC ANOVA RESULTS FOR BEING AN ENTREPRENEUR ON 
REFLECTIVE OUTCOMES........................................................................................................ 74 
APPENDIX I:  BOOTSTRAPPING ANALYSES RESULTS FOR THE POST HOC 
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................... 76 
APPENDIX J:  FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL MODEL ................................................................ 78 
APPENDIX K:  FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATING AND DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE FOR COLLECTION 1 OF STUDY 1 ..................................................................... 80 
APPENDIX L:  FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR 
COLLECTION 2 OF STUDY 1 ................................................................................................... 82 
APPENDIX M: FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATING AND DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE FOR STUDY 2 ........................................................................................................ 84 
APPENDIX N:  FIGURE 5: MEAN COMPARISON OF FOUNDER AND NON-FOUNDER 
ON RECOGNITION/INFORMATION COLLECTED ............................................................... 86 
APPENDIX O: BIAS-CAUSING HEURISTICS ........................................................................ 88 
APPENDIX P: HEURISTICS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP ........................................................ 93 
APPENDIX Q: MANIPULATION USED IN COLLECTION 2 OF STUDY 1 ......................... 98 
APPENDIX R: BOTH MANIPULATIONS .............................................................................. 100 
APPENDIX S: RATIONALITY MANIPULATION ................................................................. 102 
APPENDIX T: COGNITIVE REFLECTIONS TEST QUESTIONS ........................................ 104 
ix 
 
APPENDIX U: IRB APPROVAL LETTER .............................................................................. 106 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 108 
 
  
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Conceptual Model .......................................................................................................... 79 
Figure 2 Distribution of Moderating and Dependent Variable for Collection 1 of Study 1 ......... 81 
Figure 3 Distribution of Dependent Variable for Collection 2  of Study 1 .................................. 83 
Figure 4 Distribution of Moderating and Dependent Variable for Study 2 .................................. 85 
Figure 5 Mean comparison of founder and non-founders on recognition/information collected. 87 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations for Study 1 and Study 2 .... 61 
Table 2 Poisson Regression Results for Collection 1 of Study 1 ................................................. 63 
Table 3 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for Collection 1 of Study 1 ............................................ 65 
Table 4 Regression Results for Collection 2 of Study 1 ............................................................... 67 
Table 5 Alternative Regression Analysis Results for Collection 1 of Study 1 ............................. 69 
Table 6 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for Study 2 ..................................................................... 71 
Table 7 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations for the Post Hoc Sample ... 73 
Table 8 Post Hoc ANOVA Results for Being an Entrepreneur on Reflective Outcomes ............ 75 
Table 9 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for the Post Hoc Analysis .............................................. 77 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Opportunity recognition has become one of the most important and researched topics in 
the field of entrepreneurship as one cannot start a venture until they recognize an opportunity and 
then determine if that opportunity is for them. Recently, scholars have suggested that this 
recognition process unfolds over two stages. I focus on the first stage of this process, the 
formation of an opportunity recognition belief, where individuals form the belief that there is an 
opportunity for someone who is willing and able to take advantage of it (a third person 
opportunity). Research on the formation of opportunity recognition beliefs has primarily focused 
on individual differences (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012). Recently, however, research has begun 
to focus on the cognitive processes that may set entrepreneurs apart from non-entrepreneurs and 
help them recognize opportunities (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Shepherd, Haynie, & McMullen, 
2012).   
Entrepreneurial cognition research has suggested that entrepreneurs are likely to use and 
potentially benefit from heuristics, which are often thought to be quick mental shortcuts that 
allow for satisfactory solutions (Baron, 1998, 2004; Busentiz, 1999; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; 
Shepherd et al., 2012; Simon, 1990). Specifically, research has suggested that the use of 
heuristics may better allow entrepreneurs to recognize opportunities (Baron, 2004; Baron & 
Ward, 2004; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Zahra, Korri & Yu, 2005). Although some heuristics, 
particularly well-refined and accurate prototypes, may be valuable in the opportunity recognition 
process, a vast amount of research shows other types of heuristics (i.e., bias-causing heuristics) 
systematically lead to irrational, biased, and inaccurate judgments (Baron, 2004; Kahneman, 
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2011). The former has been considered in the entrepreneurship literature; however, the latter has 
received far less attention. I seek to consider the latter and specifically how these bias-causing 
heuristics (e.g., the betrayal heuristic) lead to irrational, biased, and inaccurate judgments related 
to forming the belief that one has recognized an opportunity (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). In 
doing so, I consider the underlying causal process through which the use of these types of 
heuristics diminishes the ability to form an opportunity recognition belief. Specifically, I posit 
that these heuristics reduce the ability to form the belief that one has recognized opportunities by 
causing entrepreneurs to consider less information about the potential opportunity. 
I also propose two individual differences that allow certain entrepreneurs to mitigate the 
negative effect that these bias-causing heuristics have on entrepreneurs’ ability to form the belief 
that they have recognized an opportunity. I suggest that these individual differences enable some 
entrepreneurs to overcome bias-causing heuristics and consider more information about an 
opportunity, making them more likely to recognize that opportunity. I rely on a dual-process 
theory of cognition to suggest that some entrepreneurs are more likely to shift from a heuristic-
based, fast style of thinking to a more deliberate slower style of thinking, allowing them to 
overcome bias-causing heuristics. Specifically, I consider the need for cognition, which is 
associated with individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive activity and entrepreneurial alertness, 
which is associated with entrepreneurs who have “a sense of what might be around the corner” 
and with entrepreneurs being particularly sensitive to changes and unnoticed possibilities 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Kizner, 2009, p. 152; Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012). In doing so, I 
suggest that entrepreneurs high in each of these differences are more likely to override their 
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initial, biased, fast judgments, enabling them to consider additional information and as such be 
more likely to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006).  
In considering the effect of bias-causing heuristics on the formation of an opportunity 
recognition belief, I rely on McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) conceptual model of 
entrepreneurial action. This model suggests that information reduces uncertainty and allows 
entrepreneurs to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity. As noted above, I 
exclusively consider the cognitive process related to forming the belief that one has recognized 
an opportunity for the willing and able (a third-person opportunity) and not the evaluation 
process related to recognizing an opportunity for himself or herself (a first-person opportunity) 
(McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Recognizing a third-person opportunity is a necessary but not 
sufficient step in recognizing a first-person opportunity. Although the cognitive process related 
to recognizing an opportunity for oneself is an interesting question for future consideration, 
research has shown that the cognitive processes related to third-person and first-person 
opportunities differ (Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010a; Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; Haynie, 
Shepherd, & McMullen, 2009). Thus, for the purpose of this project, I solely focus on the 
cognitive process related to the first step in the opportunity recognition process, the formation of 
the belief that one has recognized an opportunity for the willing and able. 
In examining this causal process, I rely on a dual-process theory of cognition, specifically 
a default-interventionist model (Evans, 2007). Generally, this model suggests that people rely on 
both an autonomous processing system (system 1) and an analytical processing system (system 
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2). The autonomous system is fast and typically thought to use a heuristic-type of processing. 
Alternatively, the analytical system is slower and is typically thought to use both a reflective 
level and an algorithmic level of processing (Evans, 2007). The reflective level is related to 
differences in individual thinking dispositions that regulate behavior (e.g., how much 
information is considered in making a decision) and is responsible for triggering the use of the 
algorithmic level. Whereas, the algorithmic level is related to the cognitive ability (the 
horsepower) that one has available when making decisions and is responsible for actually 
determining the correct decision (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Further, this model suggests that 
individuals first rely on their autonomous processing system (system 1), which requires little 
cognitive effort to provide default judgments. Once a default judgment has been made, an 
individual’s analytical processing system (system 2) may or may not intervene. If the analytical 
system does intervene, it may override or endorse the autonomous system’s default judgment 
(Evans, 2007). 
A default-interventionist model provides multiple advantages in examining the process I 
seek to consider. First, it describes the cognitive process through which bias-causing heuristics 
inhibit the consideration of information and in doing so reduces the likelihood of forming an 
opportunity recognition belief. Further, this model provides a strong theoretical justification that 
points to two individual differences that should alleviate the negative effect that bias-causing 
heuristics have on the consideration of information. Specifically, I consider the need for 
cognition and entrepreneurial alertness, both of which have been associated with higher levels of 
reflective cognitive processing (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Stanovich, 2009a). Thus, when initially 
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relying on a bias-causing heuristic, individuals high in each of these individual differences are 
more likely to shift from their fast processing style to a slower, more deliberate processing style, 
allowing them to overcome the bias-causing heuristic. This shift, in turn, should allow these 
individuals to consider additional information about an opportunity and therefore be more likely 
to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity when initially relying on a bias-
causing heuristic. 
I test my theory with an experimental design that uses a product from a technology 
transfer office that has been licensed by entrepreneurs and applied to a real-world market. This 
allows me to isolate the underlying variables of interest and to affix my theorizing to a well-
documented phenomenon (the licensing and application of tech-transfer technology/products by 
entrepreneurs) (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; Mowery, 2004; Shane, 2001). These features of my 
research provide a strong case for determining the causal sequence of the process and the 
external validly of my theorizing (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012).  
The major contribution of my study is to examine the theoretical underpinnings as to why 
certain types of heuristics (bias-causing heuristics) inhibit entrepreneurs from forming the belief 
that they have recognized an opportunity. Specifically, I suggest that bias-causing heuristics 
reduce the amount of information that entrepreneurs consider about an opportunity and, as such, 
inhibit opportunity recognition beliefs. Second, I propose two individual differences that have 
been associated with higher levels of reflective cognitive processing (entrepreneurial alertness 
and the need for cognition) as first stage moderators to this process. Specifically, I suggest that 
these reflective individuals are likely to shift to a deliberate cognitive style that increases their 
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chances of forming an opportunity recognition belief because they consider more information 
about the opportunity. Overall, I hope to point out that although a heuristic-dependent processing 
style has been shown to be beneficial with regard to opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004), the 
failure to consider the downside of certain heuristics and benefits related to overcoming these 
heuristics may limit our understanding of the opportunity recognition process.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
The goal of this research project is to consider how the use of certain cognitive heuristics 
affects opportunity recognition beliefs through the consideration of information. Generally, I rely 
on a dual process theory of cognition, particularly a default-interventionist model, to discuss the 
influence that these bias-causing cognitive heuristics have on the consideration of information 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). I also rely on a theory of entrepreneurial action to discuss how 
information influences opportunity recognition belief (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). In the 
following sections, I first discuss opportunity recognition and lay out key assumptions related to 
the construct. Then I more thoroughly detail the specific types of heuristics that I am 
considering.  Next, I discuss how these cognitive heuristics influence the consideration of 
information. Finally, I explain how the consideration of information affects the formation of an 
opportunity recognition belief. Once I have discussed the indirect effect that these bias-causing 
cognitive heuristics have on opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of 
information, I consider two key individual differences (the need for cognition and 
entrepreneurial alertness) that moderate the first stage of this indirect effect. Specifically, I 
suggest that when faced with contexts that trigger these bias-causing heuristics, individuals high 
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in each of these differences are more likely to consider information and thus form the belief that 
they have recognized an opportunity. A graphical depiction of my theoretical model is presented 
in Figure 1.  
Opportunity Recognition Belief 
Opportunity recognition belief is the outcome variable that I focus on in this dissertation. 
The conceptualization of opportunity recognition is an important and central focus to the study of 
entrepreneurship (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkas, & Spector, 2009). However, 
significant conceptual debate exists regarding whether opportunities are discovered or created 
(Gregoire et al., 2010b; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). I adopt Gregoire and colleagues’ (2010) 
conceptualization of opportunity recognition belief, which attempts to integrate both views and 
transcend this debate, as my dependent variable. This conceptualization is represented by the 
subjective level of certainty that an entrepreneur has regarding a potential opportunity for the 
willing and able (someone) (Gregoire et al., 2010b). Further, I propose that the effect that bias-
causing heuristics have on forming the belief that one has recognized and opportunity is equally 
applicable to both conceptualizations (discovery/created) of an opportunity. Below, I discuss the  
ongoing debate regarding opportunity recognition generally and more fully detail Gregoire and 
colleagues’ (2010) conceptualization of opportunity recognition belief. 
 Generally, theories of discovery assume that disruptions in efficient markets arise from 
external shocks (e.g., technology changes) and create real opportunities. These opportunities are 
thought to objectively exist independent of entrepreneurs that may perceive them (Kirzner, 1973; 
Shane, 2003; Shane, & Venkataraman, 2000). From, this perspective, because opportunities 
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objectively exist, information can be gathered about them to determine their possible outcomes 
and the probability of each outcome. From a discovery perspective, decisions associated with 
opportunity recognition are risky (i.e., possible outcomes and the probability of each outcome 
can be determined) but not uncertain from a knightian perspective (i.e., information to determine 
possible outcomes and their likelihood does not exist) (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Knight, 1921). 
Alternatively, creation theorists propose that opportunities do not objectively exist independent 
of the actions that entrepreneurs take to create them. Instead, entrepreneurs’ actions and 
interactions with the environment are thought to create opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; 
Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2001). Thus, from a 
creation perspective, because opportunities do not exist until entrepreneurs act, information 
about all of the possible outcomes and the probabilities associated with each outcome cannot be 
determined ex ante. Therefore, creation theorists propose that decisions associated with 
opportunity recognition are uncertain from a knightian perspective (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). 
Recent research, however, has attempted to transcend these conceptual positions and has 
suggested a more integrative view of opportunity recognition (Gregoire et al., 2010b; McMullen 
& Shepherd, 2006). Specifically, Gregoire and colleagues (2009) define an opportunity “as 
projected courses of action to introduce (and profit from) new and/or improved supply-demand 
combinations that seek to address market failure problems” (p. 117). This view adopts the notion 
that entrepreneurial opportunities originate from failures of the market process, which suggests 
that opportunities exist and are recognized (Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Dean & McMullen, 2007; 
Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Gregoire et al., 2010b; Kirzner, 1985, 1997). As noted by Gregoire and 
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colleagues (2009), however, these market failures (i.e. lack of market efficiencies) are just the 
origins of the opportunities and require the possibility of action on the part of the entrepreneur, 
which is more consistent with the creation side of the conceptual debate (Drucker, 1985; 
Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001).  
From this view, opportunities are not specifically about the supply side (i.e., the creation 
of a technology) or the demand side (i.e., opportunities that exist in the current market). Instead 
opportunities relate to the possibility of changing the demand side with the supply side (i.e., 
using a new technology to change the current market) (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012). Thus, this 
view does not focus on discovery or creation of opportunities but instead on the “ex ante 
interface between situation and action as individuals try to make sense of information signals that 
could indicate opportunities” (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012, p. 756). That is, from a forward-
looking perspective, opportunities are about an entrepreneur realizing the actions that might 
make a more efficient transaction possible when considering the parameters of the environment 
(Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012).  
This view assumes that opportunities are fundamentally uncertain becuase their actual 
value can only be determined after the fact. In discussing uncertainty, however, this view adopts 
Lipshitz and Strauss’ (1997) conceptualization of “uncertainty in the context of action [as] a 
sense of doubt that blocks or delays action” (p. 150). This conceptualization of uncertainty is 
inclusive and does not refer to a specific type of doubt but instead is conceptualized with regard 
to its influence on action (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Thus whether conceptualized as 
Knightian uncertainty (which is not susceptible to measurement and such unknowable) (Knight, 
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1921) or risk (which is susceptible to measurement) (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986), this 
conceptualization of uncertainty prevents action (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Further, as the 
actual value of opportunities can only be determined after the fact, the recognition of 
opportunities relies on subjective views and possible projections (what could be) based on some 
environmental stimuli. The actual potential for opportunities, however, is rooted in objective 
information and market failure dynamics (i.e. lack of market efficiencies) . Thus, opportunity 
recognition “rests on the subjective perception and interpretation of objective realities” (Gregoire 
et al., 2010b, p. 118). 
This view of opportunity recognition also adopts McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) two-
stage model of entrepreneurial action, which suggests that third-person opportunities (forming 
the belief that there is an opportunity for someone) are conceptually and empirically different 
than first-person opportunities (an opportunity for me) (Dimov, 2007; Gregoire & Shepherd, 
2012; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Specifically, identifying a third-person opportunity relates 
to the recognition that there is an opportunity for someone, whereas identifying a first-person 
opportunity relates to an individual’s willingness to bear the uncertainty associated with 
exploiting the third-person opportunity. Evidence has suggested that the cognitive processes 
associated with third-person opportunities and first-person opportunities are different and that the 
measures of each are distinct (Gregoire et al., 2010a; Gregoire et al., 2010b; Gregoire & 
Shepherd, 2012; Haynie et al., 2009). 
 Based on these distinctions, opportunity recognition is concerned with subjective beliefs 
that a third-person opportunity exists (an opportunity for someone) (Gregoire et al., 2010b; 
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Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 2007). McMullen and Shepherd (2006) have noted that 
uncertainty acts to undermine these beliefs. This leads to the above noted conception of 
opportunity recognition belief that is represented by the subjective level of certainty that an 
entrepreneur has regarding a potential opportunity for the willing and able (someone) (Gregoire 
et al., 2010b). 
Heuristics  
Simon (1990) argued that heuristics are “methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions 
with modest amounts of computation,” suggesting that heuristics are a way in which people 
reduce their effort and save time when making decisions (p. 11). Heuristics have been noted to 
reduce effort by allowing people to examine fewer pieces of information and by reducing the 
difficulty associated with retrieving and storing information (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
Heuristics are often thought to be accurate and thus generally appear to be useful in decision-
making (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  
The usefulness of some heuristics has been explored in the entrepreneurship literature. 
Specifically, research has suggested that entrepreneurs are more likely to use heuristics than non-
entrepreneurs and that the use of some heuristics is beneficial to entrepreneurs (Baron 1998, 
2004; Baron & Ward, 2004; Busentiz, 1999; Busenitz & Barney 1997; Zahra et al., 2005). In 
fact, heuristic-type thinking and the use of accurate, well-refined prototypes have been noted to 
be advantageous with regard to opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004; Baron & Ensley, 2006; 
Baron & Ward, 2004). More specifically, Baron and Ensley (2006) noted that some 
entrepreneurs possess well-refined business opportunity prototypes and as such are likely to 
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recognize opportunities when products, services, and other environmental attributes and patterns 
match these prototypes, whereas, not possessing these prototypes likely leads to overlooking 
such opportunities. 
Heuristics-based processing, however, is not without flaws. Specifically, there is a 
substantial literature in psychology that has shown some heuristics lead to cognitive biases and 
systematic errors (Kahneman, 2011). The entrepreneurship literature has also noted that these 
bias-causing heuristics have potentially negative effects on the ability to recognize opportunities 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2009). The potentially negative effects related to these 
heuristics, however, have received far less attention than the benefits associated with heuristics 
generally. Further, the underlying causal process through which these heuristics negatively affect 
the ability to recognize opportunities has not been considered. Thus, for the purpose of this 
dissertation, I focus on these bias-causing heuristics that negatively affect the ability to form an 
opportunity recognition belief. In the next section, I briefly list some of the most common 
heuristics and resulting biases and then more thoroughly discuss the way in which three of these 
heuristics (representativeness, affect, and betrayal) lead to biased decisions.  
Bias-causing heuristic 
Bias-causing heuristics have a long tradition in the psychology literature. Kahneman and 
Tversky’s research program on heuristic and bias has shown these types of heuristics result in 
systematically inaccurate judgments (Kahneman, 2011). Common biases that systematically 
result from these heuristics include erase of recall and retrievability caused by the availability 
heuristic; insensitivity to base rates, insensitivity to sample size, misconception of chance, 
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regression to the mean, and the conjunction fallacy caused by the representativeness heuristic; 
and the confirmation trap, anchoring, conjunctive, and disjunctive event bias, overconfidence 
and hind sight/the curse of knowledge caused by the confirmation heuristic (see Bazerman & 
Moore, 2012, for a review). Other heuristics that have been shown to systematically bias 
decisions include the affect heuristic, the outrage heuristic, and the betrayal heuristic (Bazerman 
& Moore, 2012; Kahneman, 2011, Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Sunstein 2003, 2005). A more thorough description of these and other bias-
causing heuristics are provided in Appendix O and a review of the literature where heuristics 
have been applied to entrpeneurship is provided in Appendix P. 
So, why would these heuristics systematically lead to biased, non-rational, and inaccurate 
judgments? The well-documented research program on heuristics and biases has suggested that 
these errors often occur due to attribute substitution, where automatically computed attributes 
provide answers to different questions than the one actually being considered (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002). In this case, “judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a 
specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that object —
the heuristic attribute— which comes more readily to mind” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 
4). This substitution inevitably leads to a systematic bias because “the target attribute and the 
heuristic attribute are different” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 5).  
This type of heuristic-based attribute substitution affects all types of decisions and 
judgments. Consider the following classic example that is based on the representativeness 
heuristic where participants are told, “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. 
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She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination 
and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983, p. 297). Participants are then asked the probability of different scenarios for Linda. 
Scenarios include descriptions such as “Linda is a teacher at an elementary school.” More 
importantly, two of the scenarios note, “Linda is a bank teller” and “Linda is a bank teller and is 
active in the feminist movement.” Interestingly, the great majority of people find that Linda is 
more likely to be a bank teller and active in the feminist movement than just a bank teller. This, 
of course, is a mathematical impossibility because if Linda is a bank teller and active in the 
feminist movement, by definition, she is also a bank teller. Thus, the probability of her being a 
bank teller could not be less than the probability of her being a bank teller and active in the 
feminist movement. In this case, people appear to answer the question “[h]ow representative is 
Linda of a feminist bank teller?” instead of how likely Linda is to be a bank teller or a feminist 
bank teller (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 216).
i
 
Another example of a well-documented heuristic that is based on attribute substitution is 
the affect heuristic (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In the case of the affect heuristic, decision 
makers may focus on how they feel about something, whether they like it or not, instead of 
answering the underlying question, which may be, “Will she be a good employee?” or “Is this a 
good investment?” (Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman (2011) provided an example where tens of 
millions of dollars were invested by a CIO of a large financial firm based on the affect heuristic. 
In that case, the CIO made the multimillion-dollar investment in Ford stock not because a 
detailed economic analysis led him to believe that the stock was underpriced but because he 
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liked the company. While it is true that well-liked companies are often successful in the market, 
it is doubtful that anyone would hire a financial advisor who bases his or her investment 
decisions on which companies he or she personally likes, with no formal or rational analysis.  
Attribute substitution also appears to be related to the betrayal heuristic, which I will 
focus on and operationalize in this paper. The betrayal heuristic appears closely tied to the affect 
heuristic and is a rule of thumb where people, “Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust” 
(Sunstein, 2005, p. 537; Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010). That is, it seems that 
when people are making judgments about things that include a betrayal, they answer the 
question, “Does this betray?” as opposed to the underlying question (e.g., What punishment does 
this person deserve? or Which product is better?). For example, Koehler and Gershoff (2003) 
showed that people punished identical criminal offenses significantly more when they also 
involved betrayal (e.g., people punished a security guard more than a janitor in regard to a bank 
robbery and a day-care worker more than a grocery clerk in regard to child molestation).  
The effect of the betrayal heuristic is not limited to punishment or even to people. 
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) have also shown that this heuristic relates to decisions about 
products. Specifically, they gave participants the option to purchase car A that was equipped 
with an airbag (that would not cause death) where the chance of death from a serious crash was 
2% or car B that was equipped with an airbag (that would cause death an additional .01% of the 
time) where the chance of death from a serious crash was 1%. In this case, the rational choice is 
clearly Car B (i.e., the car that is equipped with the airbag that causes death an additional .01% 
of the time) as the overall chance of death associated with Car B was 1.01%, whereas Car A (i.e., 
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the car that is equipped with the airbag that does not cause death) has an overall chance of death 
of 2% of the time. Interestingly, more than two-thirds of participants choose car A, suggesting 
that people are willing to “double their overall chance of dying to avoid incurring a very small 
chance of dying via betrayal” (Koehler and Gershoff, 2003, p. 255). In this case, the betrayal is 
that a product that is supposed to protect you ends up killing you. Thus, as noted above, it 
appears that participants focused on how they felt about the car as opposed to which car was 
better/safer.  
Bias-causing heuristics and the decision to consider additional information 
 It is important to note that I am specifically focusing on the effect that these bias-causing 
heuristics have on opportunity recognition belief. In particular, I propose that the use of these 
types of heuristics negatively affects the ability to form an opportunity recognition belief and that 
this effect is mediated by the consideration of information. More specifically, I suggest that the 
use of these heuristics reduces the amount of information considered, which in turn, reduces the 
ability to form the belief that one has recognized an opportunity. Further, I suggest that some 
individuals are less likely to be affected by these bias-causing heuristics. I acknowledge, 
however, that in some situations, some bias-causing heuristics could lead to the consideration of 
more information. These situations, however, are less interesting in regard to the outcome 
variable because they likely lead to the same prediction regardless of whether the bias occurs. 
That is, in these situations, entrepreneurs likely form the same opportunity recognition belief 
regardless of the bias-causing heuristic being activated.  
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For example, the affect heuristic could lead a potential entrepreneur to consider 
additional information about a very bad/nonexistent opportunity. Consider the following 
example. If a potential entrepreneur has the ability to sell snow cone ice to Eskimos (who for the 
purposes of this dissertation we can assume would obviously have no interest in snow cone ice), 
a heuristically biased entrepreneur who loves snow cones might consider additional information 
about the opportunity. A non-heuristically biased entrepreneur, however, would likely decline 
additional information. In this case, I suggest the biased entrepreneur might be answering the 
question “How do I feel about this opportunity?” as opposed to “What do I think about it?”  The 
consideration of additional disconfirming information, however, would likely lead the biased 
entrepreneur to realize there was no opportunity for anyone. That is, when the biased 
entrepreneur learned that Eskimos have no interest in buying snow cone ice, the heuristically 
biased entrepreneur would likely realize what the non-heuristically biased entrepreneur had 
previously realized: there was no opportunity. In the situation where bias-causing heuristics leads 
to less information being considered, however, I predict that heuristically biased and non-
heuristically biased entrepreneurs will differ regarding the belief that they have recognized an 
opportunity. Thus, the rest of this dissertation will focus on situations where bias-causing 
heuristics lead to less information being considered. For the ease of illustration, I will 
specifically focus on heuristics that I posit always lead to less information being considered such 
as the betrayal heuristic.  
I specifically chose to use the betrayal heuristic because it squarely fits into the types of 
bias-causing heuristics that I seek to consider, because it constitutes a strong manipulation and 
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because it was easily adapted to the context I seek to explore in this dissertation. More 
specifically, the betrayal heuristic is the type of heuristic that systematically leads to non-rational 
and inaccurate decisions. This heuristic is also the type of heuristic that pushes people away from 
the stimuli. In an opportunity recognition context this should cause participants to consider less 
information about a business opportunity, which as noted above are the situations I exclusively 
seek to consider. Further, after pretesting multiple heuristic manipulations, betrayal consistently 
proved to be the strongest manipulation, which is important for the type of experimental design 
that I employ in both of my studies. Lastly, the betrayal heuristic was easily adapted in an 
understandable way to the entrepreneurial setting.  
Bias-causing heuristics and the decision to consider less information 
 Heuristics research has also examined specific heuristics that relate to the way in which 
people search for and consider information (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). These heuristics are 
rules of thumb that people typically use in determining how they search for information (e.g., 
one may always stop collecting information after he or she has seen two confirming pieces of 
information (Karelaia, 2006)). These specific heuristics, however, are outside the purview of this 
paper, as they are rules of thumb regarding the process that an individual uses when considering 
information after deciding to consider information and not rules of thumb that affect the decision 
to consider information. These types of heuristics, however, show that individuals may only use 
a small amount of the information available when making judgments (Shah & Oppenheimer, 
2008). In fact, some suggest that individuals may only consider a single piece of information 
when making a judgment (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
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Considering less information is in line with heuristics being an effort-reduction tool 
(Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Relying on, “how I feel about a company?” as compared to, “is 
this a good investment?” reduces time and effort in making a judgment in much the same way 
relying on a single piece of information is faster and easier than considering all of the 
information available in a compensatory manner (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Thus, it seems 
likely that judgments based on bias-causing heuristics (i.e., determining that an investment is bad 
because one does not personally like it) may also lead individuals to reduce their effort and 
consider less information. Thus, I suggest that when entrepreneurs rely on bias-causing 
heuristics, they are more likely to make systematically inaccurate judgments that reduce the 
likelihood of considering additional information about an opportunity. Formally hypothesized as: 
Hypothesis 1. Relying on bias-causing heuristics reduces the amount of information 
considered related to an opportunity. 
The Consideration of Information and Opportunity Recognition Belief 
Information has also been related to the conceptualization of opportunity recognition 
belief that I adhere to in this paper, the subjective level of certainty that an entrepreneur has 
regarding a potential opportunity for someone (i.e. the willing and able ) (Gregoire et al., 2010a). 
In fact, the entrepreneurship literature has suggested that the discriminating feature between an 
entrepreneur who recognizes a third-person opportunity and one who does not is knowledge and 
relevant information (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2007). Specifically, the 
literature has suggested that information about the environment and relevant knowledge reduce 
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uncertainty, allowing entrepreneurs to overcome ignorance, enabling them to form the belief that 
they have recognized an opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2007). 
Generally, the literature appears consistent in noting the importance of information and 
suggests that individuals who have better access to, or a superior ability to utilize, information 
are better able to recognize opportunity (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Shane, 2003). Thus, I suggest by 
considering more information, potential entrepreneurs are more likely to form the belief that they 
have recognized an opportunity. Formally hypothesized as follows:  
Hypothesis 2. The amount of information considered related to an opportunity is positively 
related to opportunity recognition belief. 
Taken together, Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that relying on bias-causing heuristics has a 
negative, indirect effect on forming the belief that one has recognized an opportunity. 
Specifically, I propose that relying on bias-causing heuristics reduces the amount of information 
that an entrepreneur considers about an opportunity, which in turn reduces the likelihood of 
forming the belief that the entrepreneur has recognized an opportunity. Formally hypothesized as 
follows:    
Hypothesis 3. The amount of information considered mediates the negative relationship 
between the reliance on bias-causing heuristics and the likelihood of forming an opportunity 
recognition belief. 
Individual Differences That May Help Individuals Overcome Heuristic-Based Biases  
Recently, many psychologists have adopted a dual process approach that helps explain 
the existence and use of heuristics. This dual process approach argues that humans rely on two 
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distinct types of information processing systems (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; 
Sloman, 1996). Each system has been referred to in many different ways, but for the purpose of 
this dissertation, I will use the most widely used descriptors, system 1 and system 2. 
System 1  is often thought to be the older of the two systems from an evolutionary 
perspective (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 1994; Reber, 1992). It involves the seamlessly 
effortless and automatic learning and processing of information (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Stanovich 
& West, 2000). Evans and Stanovich (2013) have suggested its defining features are that it does 
not require working memory, and that it operates autonomously. It is typically associated with 
being fast, non-conscious, contextualized, automatic, independent of cognitive ability, and biased 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
System 2 is thought to be more deliberate and allows for intentional learning, 
development, and analysis of ideas (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Evans and Stanovich (2013) have 
suggested its defining features are that it requires working memory and that it involves cognitive 
decoupling, hypothetical thinking, and mental stimulation. It is typically associated with being 
slower, controllable, providing normative responses, being conscious, and using consequential 
decision-making (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Generically, dual process approaches suggest the use of distinct cognitive and 
neurological systems; however, there are different interpretations as to how these distinctive 
systems work together (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). I rely on a default-
interventionist theory that suggests a fast autonomous process (system 1) provides initial 
responses and that the slower analytic process (system 2) acts as a check and may or may not 
22 
 
intervene (Evans, 2007, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Put another 
way:  
Heuristic process often cue default mental models that imply—with only shallow 
analytic processing of the task requirements—default responses, inference or 
decisions. Analytic processes may or may not intervene in order to revise or 
replace such default models and to inhibit default heuristic responding. (Evans, 
2007, p. 329) 
From a default-interventionist perspective, heuristic biases would occur when system 2 
(the analytical process) does not intervene and override system 1 (the heuristic process) errors 
(Evans, 2008). Thus, individuals who are more able and/or likely to shift to and use their 
analytical processes would be less likely to make heuristic-based errors.
ii
   
As briefly discussed above, the cognitive process that leads to overriding system 1 default 
judgments is best understood when viewing system 2 as containing, “two levels of processing—
the algorithmic level and the reflective level” (Stanovich, 2009a, p. 57). The difference between 
these levels of processing can be understood by considering differences between measures of 
thinking dispositions and cognitive ability. Measures of cognitive ability are related to the 
algorithmic processes’ ability, “to sustain decoupled representations” and is largely related to 
measures of general intelligence (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Alternatively, the reflective process 
operates “to set the goal agenda or …. in the service of epistemic regulation (i.e., to direct the 
sequence of information pickup)” (Stanovich, 2009a, p. 66-67). Measures of thinking 
dispositions, which are related to the reflective process, are less related to general intelligences 
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and are, “higher level regulatory states of the reflective mind” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 
230). These higher-level regulatory states include:  
the tendency to collect information before making up one’s mind, the tendency to 
seek various points of view before coming to a conclusion, the disposition to think 
extensively about a problem before responding, the tendency to calibrate the 
degree of strength of one’s opinion to the degree of evidence available, the 
tendency to think about future consequences before taking action, and the 
tendency to explicitly weigh pluses and minuses of situations before making a 
decision. (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 230) 
Evans and Stanovich (2013) have suggested that system 1 is overridden by the 
algorithmic processing of system 2 but that the reflective processing of system 2 causes the 
override itself. That is, the reflective level of processing is responsible for the shift itself, and the 
algorithmic level is related to the mental ability needed to analyze information and determine if 
the heuristic-based judgment is correct. Thus, the likelihood that system 2 will override system 1 
is based on both individuals’ cognitive ability and thinking disposition, but the initial override is 
likely initiated by thinking dispositions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). For a more thorough 
discussion on this topic, please see Evans and Stanovich (2013) and Stanovich (2009a, 2009b, 
2011). 
In this context, where I suggest that a bias-causing heuristic leads to the decision to not 
consider additional information, individual cognitive ability would likely allow (provide the 
mental horsepower) entrepreneurs to determine if the decision to not consider additional 
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information (system 1’s decision) was an error. I am more interested, however, in individual 
differences that allow a potential entrepreneur to override his or her initial intuitive system 1 
decision to not consider more information, which is what is responsible for the use of the 
individual cognitive ability in the first place. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on 
individual differences that relate to the reflective level of processing. Specifically, I focus on two 
individual differences. First, I consider the need for cognition, a rational thinking disposition that 
relates to an increased reflective level of processing. Second, I consider entrepreneurial alertness. 
This construct is typically associated with the increased use of heuristic-based processing but is 
also related to an increased sensitivity to information that does not conform to heuristic 
responses and the adjustment of such responses (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Thus, it should also 
relate to an increased reflective level of processing.  
The need for cognition 
Within the dual process literature, the need for cognition has been noted to be an 
individual difference at the intentional level and associated with the increased use of reflective 
processing (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, Blair, & Jarvis, 1996; Stanovich, 2009a). Thus, it likely 
leads to the reassessment of initial decisions based on bias-causing heuristics and the potential 
overriding of an initial inaccurate heuristic-based judgment.  
Research on the need for cognition most notably comes from Cacioppo and Petty (1982), 
who suggest that people differ in how much they enjoy and engage in effortful cognitive activity. 
They suggest that both high- and low-need for cognition individuals seek to make sense of the 
world around them; however, these individuals tend to go about this in different ways (Cacioppo, 
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Kao, Petty, & Rodriguez, 1986; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Morris, 1983). Individuals with a high need for cognition seek out, think about, thoroughly 
process, and reflect back on information to make sense of stimuli and the world around them. 
Alternatively, individuals with a low need for cognition are more likely to rely on simple cues 
and others’ opinions and use cognitive heuristics (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kearney, Gebert, & 
Voelpel, 2009; Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009). This would suggest that compared to 
low need for cognition individuals, high need for cognition individuals may be more reflective 
because they are less resistant to mental work and as such are more willing to shift to and use 
their analytical system. Thus, in the case where a bias-causing heuristic is triggered, high need 
for cognition individuals who are less resistant to using their analytical system should be more 
able to avoid making an inaccurate judgment. This assertion appears to be supported in the 
literature, as it has been shown that high need for cognition individuals are more likely to 
“correct or adjust their judgments for biasing factors than …. individuals low in need for 
cognition” (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Martin, 1986; Strack, 1992). 
In regard to the indirect effect that bias-causing heuristics have on opportunity 
recognition beliefs through the consideration of information, I suggest that high need for 
cognition entrepreneurs are more likely to override heuristic-based judgments, consider 
additional information, and form an opportunity recognition belief when they encounter a bias-
causing heuristic. Alternatively, this indirect relationship should be weaker or non-existent when 
no bias-causing heuristic is present. This is because when no bias-causing heuristic is present, 
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low need for cognition individuals do not have a simple cue that suggests they should not 
consider additional information to rely on. Formally hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 4. Entrepreneurs’ need for cognition moderates the first stage of the indirect 
effect that relying on bias-causing heuristics has on opportunity recognition belief via the 
amount of information considered, such that the indirect effect is weaker for 
entrepreneurs with high levels of need for cognition. 
Entrepreneurial alertness 
 Entrepreneurial alertness is often discussed as the ability to notice opportunities without 
search and has been related to having accurate mental models and schemas that appear to be in 
line with using heuristic-based processing (Baron, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Thus, it seems 
that alert entrepreneurs tend to rely on accurate heuristics. Alert entrepreneurs are also more 
likely to adjust their mental models to incorporate new information (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). In 
doing so, they are able to shift from a heuristic-based processing style to an analytical processing 
style and override their initial inaccurate heuristic-based judgments. Thus, alert individuals also 
appear to be more reflective in their processing style. This view is in line with Kizner’s (1974) 
original definitions of the construct. Specifically, Kizner (1979) defined the construct in two 
different ways: first, as “the ability to notice without search opportunities that have hitherto been 
overlooked” (p. 49) and second as “a motivated propensity of man to formulate an image of the 
future” (Kirzner, 1985, p. 56). While the first definition does appear to be related to heuristic-
based thinking (system 1), the second involves the motivation to think hypothetically, which is 
clearly related to the analytical system (system 2). Specifically, the motivation to think 
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hypothetically relates to the reflective process of the analytical system, and thinking 
hypothetically is associated with the algorithmic process of the analytic system (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013).  
Based on Kizner’s work, Gaglio (2001) has noted that the crucial difference between 
opportunity finders and non-finders is their ability to accurately perceive reality as well as 
potential implications and consequences of actions. That is, the more accurately a potential 
entrepreneur can perceive the environment, the more likely he or she will be able to determine if 
existing products and services are working and the potential for an opportunity (Gaglio & Katz, 
2001). Thus, alert entrepreneurs may possess complex and accurate models of what a successful 
opportunity looks like and as such they are able to easily notice such opportunities (Baron, 2004; 
Baron & Ensley, 2006). These mental models/heuristics, however, are not innate but instead 
refined over time and through the use of the analytical system (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Thus, I would suggest that alert entrepreneurs have more 
accurate mental models/heuristics because they are better able to refine them.   
Gaglio and colleagues (2001) also suggest that alert individuals are particularly good at 
reassessing their current heuristics. They suggest that alert individuals emphasize objective 
accuracy (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). The goal of objective accuracy certainly falls within the 
purview of the reflective process of the analytical system. Because of this focus on objective 
accuracy, alert entrepreneurs are more likely to notice when things are “unusual, unexpected, or 
anomalous” and then realize that the most appropriate behavior may require the reassessment of 
their schema (Gaglio & Katz, 2001 p. 103). From a default-interventionist perspective, this 
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means that alert individuals are more likely to use the reflective process of their analytical 
system to initiate a system 1 override and allow the algorithmic process of the analytic system to 
reevaluate the heuristic-based judgment. This reevaluation by system 2 could lead to the 
endorsement or overriding of the heuristic system’s original judgment (Evans, 2008). If the 
heuristic-based judgment is endorsed, this confirms the accuracy of the heuristic and likely leads 
to its continued use (unchanged). Alternatively, if the heuristic-based judgment is not endorsed, 
the heuristic will likely be adjusted and perform better in the future. Either way, an increased use 
of the reflective process may explain why alert individuals have particularly accurate mental 
models.  
From a dual process perspective, it seems that alert entrepreneurs, more so than non-alert 
entrepreneurs, often rely on an accurate heuristics processing style (system 1) but also appear 
more likely to recognize situations where their heuristics are not appropriate and in these 
situations shift to a more analytical processing style (system 2). Thus, for the purposes of this 
paper, I suggest that alert entrepreneurs are less likely to make the initial inaccurate heuristics-
based judgment that they are not interested in considering additional information. This is because 
their heuristics are typically more accurate. When alert entrepreneurs do make an inaccurate 
heuristic-based judgment, however, I suggest they are more likely to override the initial 
heuristic-based judgments, consider additional information, and form an opportunity recognition 
belief. Formally hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 5. Entrepreneurs’ alertness moderates the first stage of the indirect effect that 
relying on bias-causing heuristics has on opportunity recognition belief via the amount of 
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information considered, such that the indirect effect is weaker for entrepreneurs with 
high levels of alertness.  
Method 
  In testing my hypotheses, I conducted two studies. The first study used two collections 
and considered the underlying causal process through which bias-causing heuristics reduce the 
ability to form the belief that one has recognized an opportunity through the consideration of 
information (hypotheses 1-3). In study 1 I used both a measurement of mediation approach  
(collection 1) and an experimental causal chain approach (collection 2) to explore this causal 
process. The second study further considered the mediated relationship and examined 
entrepreneurial alertness and the need for cognition as first stage moderators to this indirect 
effect (hypotheses 3-5). I used a between participant experimental design and actual 
entrepreneurs to examine these effects and further bolster the generalizability of Study 1. 
Study 1 
Study 1 used a between participant experimental-causal-chain design paired with a 
measurement of mediation approach (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Specifically, I used two 
experiments to establish the effect of independent variable (X) on a dependent variable (Y) 
through a mediator (M). The first experiment considered the relationship between the 
independent variable (the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic) and the mediator (the 
consideration of information). The first experiment also tested the indirect relationship between 
the independent variable (the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic) and the dependent variable 
(opportunity recognition belief) through the mediator (the consideration of information). The 
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second experiment then considered the relationship between the mediator (the consideration of 
information) and the dependent variable (the formation of an opportunity recognition belief).  
Procedure for collection 1 of Study 1 
In collection 1, I considered both the relationship between the reliance on a bias-causing 
heuristic and the consideration of information (XM) as well as the indirect effect that the 
reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has on forming an opportunity recognition belief though the 
consideration of information (X—MY). Although collection 1 tested mediation because both 
the mediating variable and the dependent variable were measured variables, directionality was 
difficult to establish. Thus, the second collection extended the findings of collection 1 by using 
an experimental manipulation to consider the effect that the consideration of information has on 
the formation of an opportunity recognition belief (MY). 
Both collection 1 and collection 2 relied on the application of a real technology, from a 
tech-transfer office, to a market that it was actually applied to. Specifically, participants were 
given information about the application of a low-temperature oxidation catalyst filter technology 
(hereafter referred to as “the technology”) to the personal safety market. This technology was 
originally developed at NASA’s Langley Research Center for carbon dioxide laser research. 
Smoke Mask, Inc. then applied this technology to personal safety through their personal escape 
hood that allowed for respiratory protection when escaping hazardous conditions. Applying a 
tech-transfer technology to a new market closely adheres to Gregoire and colleagues’ (2009) 
definition of an opportunity, “as projected courses of action to introduce (and profit from) new 
and/or improved supply-demand combinations that seek to address market failure problems.” (p. 
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117). Specifically, the application of the technology to the personal safety market provided a new 
and possibly better way to solve homeowners’ demands for a home-based fire safety product, a 
need that the market had failed to fully meet. Using the application of a real technology from a 
tech-transfer office is also in line with prior research that has asked entrepreneurs to look at the 
applicability of a tech transfer technology to a potential market (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; 
Shane, 2001). 
Sample for Collection 1 of Study 1 
 I tested the first link of the indirect relationship by having student participants at a large 
southeastern university identify a non-student participant. Student participants were awarded 
extra credit for identifying a non-student participant. Non-student participants then completed an 
online survey that was provided to them via email. Sixty-four non-student participants completed 
the survey. I removed nine cases (14%) where respondents did not understand the manipulation 
(specifically cases were removed where participants did not correctly indicate whether the 
product that they read about caused death, see below manipulation). My final sample was 
comprised of 55 non-student adult participants. Of the 55 participants, 31% were male; on 
average, they were 40 years old; and they were 58% Caucasian/White. Further, 26% had 
previously founded a business, and 42% of the entire sample including those who had previously 
founded a business noted they intended to found a business. 
Procedure for Collection 1 
For collection 1, I created vignettes to test hypotheses 1 and 3, which propose that the 
reliance on a bias-causing heuristic negatively impacts the consideration of information and that 
the amount of information considered mediates the negative relationship between the reliance on 
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bias-causing heuristics and the likelihood of forming an opportunity recognition belief, 
respectively. I used different descriptions about the technology market combination that either 
primed a strong bias-causing heuristic or did not. As discussed above, I relied on the betrayal 
heuristic, which is a rule of thumb where people, “Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust” 
(Sunstein, 2005, p. 537). As noted above I chose to use the betrayal heuristic because it squarely 
fits into the types of bias-causing heuristics that I seek to consider, because it constitutes a strong 
manipulation and because it was easily adapted to the context I seek to explore in this 
dissertation. In creating my manipulation, I closely followed the wording that Koehler and 
colleagues (2003) used. Specifically, in my manipulation, participants were told:  
Researchers at a large university created low-temperature oxidation catalyst filters 
to convert carbon monoxide to nontoxic carbon dioxide. The inventors of this 
technology did not want to personally pursue business opportunities because they 
are purely scientists. This technology is now part of a university’s technology 
transfer program that makes the technology available for a licensing deal with a 
new or existing firm. One possible market that researchers suggested this 
technology could be applied to is the fire safety and protection market through a 
personal rescue hood. The university technology transfer office has done some 
research related to the application of the technology to this market. We are asking 
you as a potential entrepreneur to evaluate this potential opportunity. On the 
next page we provide you with the executive summary about the opportunity, one 
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piece of information at a time. Please explore as little or as much information 
as you see fit.  
On the following page, participants were provided with an executive summary regarding 
the technology market combination one piece of information at a time. The first piece of 
information following the above description contained the heuristic manipulation to which 
participants were randomly assigned. Specifically, those in the high bias-causing heuristic 
(betrayal) condition were told: 
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to 
smoke inhalation. Scientific tests indicate, however, that there is only a 1% 
chance of death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue hood is used. The 
rescue hood, however, may also kill some homeowners. Specifically, some rescue 
hood users may die due to hood suffocation caused by the hood itself. Tests 
indicate that there is an additional one chance in 200 (0.5%) that someone who is 
in a serious fire, who uses the rescue hood, will be killed due to hood suffocation.  
Whereas participants in the low bias-causing heuristic (no betrayal) condition were told: 
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to 
smoke inhalation. Scientific tests indicate, however, that there is only a 1.5% 
chance of death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue hood is used. The 
rescue hood, however, could also cause minor side effects such as a temporary 
rash.  
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It is notable that in both conditions, the chance of death when using the hood is reduced 
from 5% to 1.5%. After viewing the manipulation participants were then asked to select one of 
the following choices, “I would like more information” or “I do not want more information.” If 
they selected “I would like more information,” an additional piece of non-heuristically charged 
information about the opportunity appeared below the first piece of information, and participants 
were asked if they wanted more information about the opportunity. This was repeated, such that 
the maximum amount of information that could be collected was the manipulation (heuristically 
charged/non-heuristically charged information) and four additional pieces of non-heuristically 
charged information. If at any point a participant selected, “I do not want more information” or 
after he or she had viewed all of the information available, they were no longer given any 
information about the opportunity. Once participants finished collecting information, they were 
asked to complete an opportunity recognition belief scale regarding the technology being applied 
to the personal safety market.  
Sample for Collection 2 of Study 1 
 I tested the second link of the indirect relationship by again having student participants at 
a large southeastern university identify a non-student participant. Student participants were 
awarded extra credit for identifying a non-student participant. Non-student participants then 
completed an online survey that was provided to them via email. Two hundred and two non-
student participants completed the survey. Of the 202 participants, 48% were male; on average, 
they were 40 years old, and they were 66% Caucasian/White. Further, 25% had previously 
founded a business, and 38% of the entire samples including those who had previously founded a 
business noted they intended to found a business. 
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Procedure for Collection 2 
 Collection 2, tested hypothesis 2 , which proposes that the amount of information 
considered impacts the formation of an opportunity recognition belief. Instructions for this 
collection were the same as the instructions for collection 1, except in this collection all 
participants were told, “On the next page we provide you with the executive summary about the 
opportunity. Please carefully consider all of the information provided.” Whereas in collection 
1, all participants were told, “On the next page we provide you with the executive summary 
about the opportunity, one piece of information at a time. Please explore as little or as much 
information as you see fit. Participants were then provided, on a single page, information about 
the opportunity. Participants were randomly assigned to the low or high information condition. 
The low information condition provided two pieces of information about the opportunity and the 
high information condition provided the same information as the low information condition plus 
two additional pieces of information. After reviewing the information manipulation, participants 
completed an opportunity recognition belief scale regarding the technology being applied to the 
personal safety market. See Appendix M for a breakdown of the manipulation.  
Measures for Collection 1 and Collection 2 of Study 1 
Amount of information considered 
I assessed the amount of information that participants considered with a count of the 
number of pieces of information that they viewed. That is, if a participant selected, “I would not 
like any more information” after viewing the manipulation (the first piece of information), he or 
she received a score of one. If the participant selected, “I would like more information” after the 
manipulation and then selected, “I would not like any more information” after viewing the 
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second piece of information, he or she received a two and so on. If the participant viewed all 
information available, he or she received a five.  
Opportunity Recognition Belief 
I assessed participants’ opportunity recognition belief with an adapted version of the measure 
developed and validated by Gregoire et al. (2010b). Participants were asked to rate how certain 
(0 = uncertain, 4 = completely certain) they were regarding the fit and the feasibility of the 
technology market combination. Sample items included “The proposed business solution can be 
used to solve the problems of the targeted market” and “The proposed business solution is 
sufficiently developed to be applied with individuals/firms in the targeted markets.” The 
reliability for this measure was .93 for Collection 1 and .84 for Collection 2. 
Results for Pretests  
Before testing my hypotheses of interest I followed Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003) 
example and confirmed the effectiveness of my betrayal manipulation. Specifically, I presented a 
pilot version of the manipulation to student and non-student participants and asked them on a 1 
(definitely no) to 5 (definitely yes) scale if the personal rescue hood betrays the people it is 
supposed to protect. Appendix O provides the earlier, slightly different, piloted version of the 
manipulation and the one used in both Study 1 and Study 2. I then conducted an analysis of 
variance on these ratings. The results indicated a significant main effect for my manipulation, 
F(1, 269) 85.22, p < .001. The betrayal description received a significantly higher rating (M = 
3.26) than the non-betrayal condition (M = 1.92) on the manipulation check question. Further, I 
conducted the same manipulation check using the same question suggested by Koehler and 
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Gershoff (2003) on the data collected for Collection 1 of Study 1. The analysis of variance on 
these ratings also indicated a significant main effect for my manipulation, F(1, 54) 13.23, p 
< .001. Specifically, the betrayal manipulation received a significantly higher rating (M = 2.64) 
than the non-betrayal condition (M = 1.56) on the manipulation check question. Thus, my 
betrayal manipulation appeared successful. 
I also pretested the rationality of decision makers’ choices based on the existence of my 
betrayal manipulation. Specifically, my studies employed a between participant design and did 
not give participants the choice between a betrayal and a non-betrayal venture. Thus, in 
following Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003) example, I used a within participant design to test the 
likelihood of participants making a non-rational choice when given an option between two 
ventures, one that reduced the chance of death by 3.5% but incorporated the betrayal heuristic 
(the rational choice) and one that only reduced the chance of death by 3% but did not incorporate 
the betrayal heuristic (the non-rational choice). Specifically, I gave participants the choice 
between licensing Hood A (no betrayal) or licensing Hood B (betrayal). Hood A did not 
incorporate the betrayal heuristic and reduced the chance of death in a serious fire from 5% to 
2%. Alternatively, Hood B incorporated the betrayal heuristic and reduced the chance of death in 
a serious fire from 5% to 1% but also caused death .5% of the time. Thus, licensing Hood B 
(betrayal) was the more rational choice because it reduced the chance of death to 1.5% as 
opposed to licensing Hood A (no betrayal) that only reduced the chance of death to 2%. A full 
depiction of this manipulation is presented in Appendix P. Interestingly, when given the choice 
between licensing these hoods, 70% of participants chose Hood A (no betrayal), the seemingly 
38 
 
less rational venture. Notably, these findings are nearly identical to the results found by Koehler 
and Gershoff (2003) when manipulating betrayal regarding safety products (airbag/fire 
alarm/vaccine). Specifically, Koehler and Gershoff (2003) found that 67.4% of people chose a 
non-betraying safety product over a betraying safety product even though the non-betraying 
safety product was associated with a greater overall chance of death. Thus, it appears my 
manipulation triggers the same heuristic type reaction as Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003) 
manipulation that leads to a less rational choice.  
Results for Study 1 
Study 1 tested hypotheses 1-3 using a between participant experimental causal chain 
design that used two experimental collections to test each link of the causal chain. Collection 1 
tested the relationship between relying on bias-causing heuristics and considering information 
related to an opportunity (Hypothesis 1) as well as the indirect relationship between relying on 
bias-causing heuristics and forming an opportunity recognition belief through the consideration 
of information (Hypothesis 3). Collection 2 then experimentally tested the relationship between 
considering information related to an opportunity and the formation of an opportunity 
recognition belief (Hypothesis 2). Taken together, these studies allow me to infer directionality 
of the indirect effect that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has on forming an opportunity 
recognition belief through the amount of information considered (Hypothesis 3).  
Results for Study 1 Collection 1 
Collection 1 of Study 1 provides data to test hypotheses 1 and 3; thus, I will present the 
results of hypothesis 3 before the results of hypothesis 2, which is tested using data from 
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Collection 2 of Study 1. Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables in Collection 1 
of Study 1 and Figure 2 graphically provides the distribution of the mediating variable (amount 
of information considered) and the dependent variable (opportunity recognition belief) that were 
used in this collection. Following procedures recommended by Cohen et al. (2003), I tested 
Hypothesis 1 using a Poisson regression (Hornsby, Kuratko, Shepherd, & Bott, 2009).
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that relying on cognitive heuristics reduces the amount of information 
considered related to an opportunity. Table 2 presents the results for this analysis. These results 
revealed a negative relationship between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic (the betrayal 
condition) and the amount of information considered (B = -.321, p < .05). The incident rate ratio 
for the heuristic condition was .73, suggesting that participants who were exposed to the betrayal 
heuristic considered about 73% of the information that participants who did not rely on the 
betrayal heuristic considered. In regard to the data from Collection 1 of Study 1, this incident rate 
ration was associated with participants in the betrayal condition considering on average 2.82 
pieces of information, whereas participants in the no betrayal condition considered on average 
3.89 pieces of information. Further, I conducted a Tobit analysis as a robustness check to ensure 
that the results of the Poisson regression were not biased due to the censorship of my dependent 
variable. Table 2 presents the results for this analysis and shows there is no difference in the 
pattern of the results. Specifically, both the Poisson and Tobit models show participants in the 
betrayal condition to consider significantly less information than participants in the non-betrayal 
condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
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I also tested Hypothesis 3 using the data from Collection 1 of Study 1. Specifically I 
tested this hypothesis using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Given that my 
mediator is a count variable, the ordinary least squares regression assumption that the estimation 
errors are homoscedastic is violated. A bootstrapping procedure, however, is appropriate for this 
analysis because it does not require standard errors and such this assumption does not apply to 
inferences about the indirect effect when using bootstrap confidence intervals (Hayes, 2012). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the amount of information considered mediates the relationship 
between the reliance on bias-causing heuristics and forming an opportunity recognition belief. 
Table 3 presents the results for this analysis. These results revealed a negative indirect 
relationship between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic (the betrayal condition) and forming an 
opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information (B = -.33). Specifically, 
my analyses demonstrated that the amount of information considered mediates the relationship 
between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic and the formation of an opportunity recognition 
belief, as the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval ([-.49, -.0005]) does not include zero.
iv 
Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is also supported, although the directionality of the results is difficult to determine 
because the mediator and the dependent variable were both measured variables.  
Results for Study 1 Collection 2 
Using regression techniques I tested Hypothesis 2 with the data from Collection 2 of 
Study 1. Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables for this collection and Figure 3 
graphically provides the distribution of the dependent variable (opportunity recognition belief) 
that was used in this collection. Hypothesis 2 predicted that considering information related to an 
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opportunity is positively related to forming an opportunity recognition belief. Table 4 presents 
the results for this analysis. These results revealed a positive relationship between the amount of 
information considered and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief (B = .21, p < .01). 
It is also notable that participants in the low information condition had an average opportunity 
recognition belief of 3.49, whereas participants in the high information condition had an average 
opportunity recognition belief of 3.92. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Discussion of Study 1  
Taken together, collection 1 and collection 2 provide evidence that: (a) relying on a bias-
causing heuristic leads to considering less information about an opportunity (Hypothesis 1); (b) 
considering less information about an opportunity reduces the likelihood of forming the belief 
that one has recognized an opportunity (Hypotheses 2); and (c) that the amount of information 
considered about an opportunity mediates the negative relationship between relying on a bias-
causing heuristic and forming the belief that one has recognized an opportunity (Hypotheses 3). 
Thus, although heuristic-based thinking is generally thought to be beneficial for entrepreneurs, it 
appears that the reliance on some heuristics can lead individuals to miss an opportunity because 
they do not consider information about the opportunity. In Study 2, I seek to determine if 
differences in cognitive processing styles allow some individuals to overcome the negative effect 
that the reliance bias-causing heuristics have on opportunity recognized through the 
considerations of less information. Specifically, I consider two individual differences 
(Entrepreneurial Alertness and the Need for Cognition) that are related to being more reflective 
in one’s cognitive processing style as first stage moderators to this process. I suggest that 
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individuals high in either of these differences are more likely to shift from their heuristic-based 
processing style to a slower, more analytical processing style and in doing so consider more 
information about the opportunity and thus be more likely to form the belief that they have 
recognized the opportunity.  In Study 2, I also extend the generalizability of my findings from 
Study 1 by using a sample of entrepreneurs. 
Study 2 
Study 2 used a between-participant experimental design. I built on Study 1 by using a 
more generalizable sample (actual entrepreneurs) to reanalyze the indirect relationship between 
the reliance on a cognitive heuristic and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief 
through the consideration of information (Hypothesis 3). Further, I considered two individual 
differences as potential moderators of this indirect effect. As theorized above, I propose two first 
stage moderators, the need for cognition (Hypothesis 4) and entrepreneurial alertness 
(Hypothesis 5).  
Sample for Study 2 
Entrepreneurs who had founded a business completed an online survey that was provided 
to them via email in return for a five-dollar Amazon gift card code that was provided to them via 
email. All respondents and contacts through which data was obtained were assured anonymity 
and confidentiality, thus their names do not appear in this document. Entrepreneurs’ email 
addresses were obtained through the following outlets. The primary researcher visited businesses 
located in the central business districts of Wyomissing, PA, Philadelphia, PA, Orlando, FL and 
Tampa, FL during business hours and asked to speak to the founding owner/s of each business. If 
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owners were available, the primary researcher asked if they would be willing to take a survey 
that would be emailed to them that evening in return for a five-dollar Amazon gift card code. If 
they were willing to partake in the survey, the survey was emailed to them within 24 hours. This 
group of potential participants was also asked to share the link with any other founding owners 
from their business or whom they knew. 
Email addresses were also obtained through multiple Chambers of Commerce. 
Specifically, the primary researcher personally visited, called and /or emailed Chambers of 
Commerce in and around the Philadelphia, PA and Orlando, FL areas. Locations, phone numbers 
and email addresses for each chamber were found through Internet searches. The primary 
researcher then asked a representative from each chamber if they would be willing to share the 
Chambers’ email list or send the survey request to members who owned and founded a business. 
Chambers could not provide their email list but some were willing to send their members the 
survey link and information.  
The primary researcher also contacted and visited incubators and entrepreneurship groups 
in Reading, PA, Orlando, FL and Tampa, FL. Locations and contact information for each 
incubator and entrepreneurship group were obtained through Internet searches. The primary 
researcher then asked representatives from each incubator for an email list of their clients (i.e. 
businesses) and representatives from entrepreneurship groups for the email addresses of their 
members. No incubator or entrepreneurship group was willing to provide their email lists but 
some were willing to send the survey link to their members. Because all entrepreneurs who were 
personally visited or contacted through an incubator, chamber or entrepreneurship group 
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responded to the same survey link, specific details of each group cannot be determined. 
However, over 100 individual businesses, two incubators, four Chambers of commerce and four 
entrepreneurship groups were contacted which resulted in 64 responses from entrepreneurs. 
These entrepreneurs founded businesses in a wide range of industries including but not limited to 
finance, technology, retail, and manufacturing. Lastly, entrepreneurs’ email addresses were also 
obtained by inviting undergraduate entrepreneurship students at a large public university to 
recruit founding entrepreneurs to partake in the survey. Students received extra credit in return 
for recruiting entrepreneurs. 
All of these efforts resulted in a final sample of 129 participants who completed the 
survey. I removed 13 (10%) cases where respondents did not understand the manipulation 
(specifically cases were removed where participants did not correctly indicate whether the 
product that they read about caused death) and 10 (9%) additional cases where the respondents 
did not qualify as entrepreneurs because they had never founded a business, leaving a sample of 
106 entrepreneurs. Of the 106 entrepreneurs, 64% were male; on average, they were 43 years 
old, 91% had at least some college courses, and they were 83% Caucasian/White. The 
entrepreneurs had founded businesses in a wide range of industries including but not limited to 
finance, technology, retail, and manufacturing.  
Procedure for Study 2 
This study used an experimental design similar to the first collection of Study 1 but also 
considered the moderating variables. This study also used the application of a real technology, 
from a tech-transfer office, to a market that it was actually applied to. Specifically, participants 
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were given the same stimulus and manipulation noted in collection 1 of Study 1 and then given 
the opportunity to collect as little or as much information as they wanted about the opportunity. 
They were then asked to complete an opportunity recognition belief scale regarding the 
technology being applied to the personal safety market. Additionally, however, participants were 
also asked to complete measures of my moderating variables, entrepreneurial alertness, and the 
need for cognition. 
Measures for Study 2 
The amount of information considered and opportunity recognition belief were collected 
in the same manner as described above. For Study 2 the reliability for the opportunity 
recognition belief scale was .85 
Entrepreneurial alertness 
I gauged entrepreneurial alertness with a 13-item measure developed by Tang, Kacmar, 
and Busenitz (2012). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with certain 
statements about themselves on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
Sample items include ‘‘I am always actively looking for new information” and ‘‘I have a gut 
feeling for potential opportunities.” The reliability for this measure was .88. 
Need for cognition 
I assessed participants’ need for cognition with the 18-item measure developed by 
Cacioppo et al. (1984). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which certain statements 
were characteristic of them on a 5-point scale (1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 5 = extremely 
characteristic). Sample items include ‘‘I would rather do something that requires little thought 
46 
 
than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities” reversed scored and ‘‘I really 
enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.” The reliability for this 
measure was .85. 
Results for Study 2 
Study 2 tested hypotheses 3-5 using a between participants experimental design and a 
more generalizable group of participants (actual entrepreneurs). Before testing my hypotheses of 
interest I followed Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003) example and confirmed the effectiveness of 
my betrayal manipulation for the data from Study 2. Specifically, I asked participants on a 1 
(definitely no) to 5 (definitely yes) scale if the personal rescue hood betrays the people it is 
supposed to protect. I then conducted an analysis of variance on these ratings. The results 
indicated a significant main effect for my manipulation, F(1, 105) 5.29, p < .05. Specifically, the 
betrayal description received a significantly higher rating (M = 2.21) than the non-betrayal 
condition (M = 1.71). Thus, my betrayal manipulation also appeared successful for Study 2. 
 Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables in Study 2 and Figure 4 
graphically provides the distribution of the mediating (amount of information considered) and 
the dependent variable (opportunity recognition belief) that were used in this collection. I tested 
hypotheses 3-5 using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Hypothesis 3 predicted the 
amount of information considered mediates the relationship between the reliance on bias-causing 
heuristics and forming an opportunity recognition belief. Table 6 presents the results for this 
analysis. These results do not indicate a significant indirect effect, as the 95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval ([-.0841, .1042]) includes zero. Thus, the results for Study 2 do not support 
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Hypothesis 3. Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted that the need for cognition and entrepreneurial 
alertness respectively moderate the indirect effect that the reliance on bias-causing heuristics has 
on opportunity recognition belief via the amount of information considered. Specifically, I 
proposed that this indirect effect is weaker for entrepreneurs with high levels of each of these 
individual differences. Table 6 presents the results for these analyses. These results show that the 
indirect effect, through the amount of information considered, is not significant at any level of 
the need for cognition or entrepreneurial alertness. Thus neither, Hypothesis 4 nor Hypothesis 5 
was supported. 
Discussion of Study 2  
Surprisingly, the results from Study 2 were inconsistent with the results from Study 1 in 
regard to hypothesis 3. Specifically, for entrepreneurs, I did not find that the amount of 
information considered about an opportunity mediates the negative relationship between relying 
on a bias-causing heuristic and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief. A closer 
inspection of the individual path relationships shows that Path A, the relationship between 
relying on a bias-causing heuristic to considering less information about an opportunity, was not 
supported (B = .05, p = ns) but that Path B, the relationship between considering information 
about an opportunity and an increased likelihood of forming the belief that one has recognized an 
opportunity, was supported (B = .12, p < .05). Further, the results for Study 2 did not find this 
non-significant indirect effect to be conditional on either the need for cognition or 
entrepreneurial alertness. Thus, the results suggest that entrepreneurs are not affected by the 
reliance on a bias-causing heuristics in regard to how much information they consider about an 
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opportunity and that, for entrepreneurs, the amount of information considered about an 
opportunity does not mediate the relationship between the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic 
and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief. 
Post Hoc Analysis 
Given the inconsistent results between Study 1 and Study 2 regarding Hypothesis 3 (the 
indirect effect through the amount of information considered), it seemed possible that the 
inconsistent findings were related to the types of participants in each sample. Specifically, I 
found a negative indirect effect from the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic to the formation of 
an opportunity recognition belief through the amount of information considered using a sample 
of working adults (26% of whom were entrepreneurs in Study 1) and a marginally significant 
indirect effect using a sample of students and adults (using an piloted version of the manipulation 
provided in Appendix N). This indirect effect, however, was not found in Study 2 when 
considered with a sample exclusively made up of entrepreneurs. As I theorize above, I generally 
suggest that reflective people (e.g. alert and high in the need for cognition) will be less likely to 
reduce the amount of information that they consider when faced with a bias-causing heuristic and 
thus be less affected by bias-causing heuristics during the opportunity recognition process. It 
seems plausible that entrepreneurs people that have previously gone through the opportunity 
recognition process and recognized an opportunity may be representative of these reflective 
people. Thus, the sample from Study 2, that was exclusively made up of entrepreneurs may have 
limited my ability to tease out conditional indirect effects based on being reflective.  
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To address that line of argument, I combined the data from collection 1 of Study 1 with 
the data from Study 2 and conducted an analysis of variance to determine whether entrepreneurs 
were significantly different in regard to variables that are associated with being reflective. 
Further, I analyzed the conditional indirect effect that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has 
on opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information based on whether the 
participant was an entrepreneur (had founded a business). The sample for the post hoc analyses 
consisted of the 106 entrepreneurs from Study 2, the ten respondents from Study 2 who did not 
qualify as entrepreneurs because they had not founded a business (see page 42) and the 55 
respondents used in Study 1. This led to a sample of 171 participants, 120 of who had founded of 
business. Fifty-three percent of the participants were male; on average, participants were 41.1 
years old; 86% had at least some college courses; and 75% were Caucasian/White. The 
entrepreneurs in the sample had founded business in a wide range of industries including but not 
limited to finance, technology, retail, and manufacturing. 
In terms of my analysis of variance, I tested to see if entrepreneurs were significantly 
higher in entrepreneurial alertness, their need for cognition, and their score on the cognitive 
reflections test. The cognitive reflections test is a three-question test designed by Frederick 
(2005) that measures how reflective someone is when making a decision. Specifically, it tests 
how likely someone is to override their initial inaccurate heuristic based response for further 
consideration that leads to the correct answer. In following Toplak, West, and Stanovich’s (2011) 
example, I created a composite of performance on the three items, which are provided in 
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Appendix Q. The mean performance for the test was 0.4 items correct (SD =.39). The reliability 
for this measure was .79.  
Table 7 presents the correlations between the variables for my post hoc analyses. Table 8 
presents the results for the analysis of variance. It is notable that sample sizes of the groups for 
this analysis are significantly different. To that, I conducted homogeneity of variance tests and 
did not find any of the variance to be significantly different. Results indicate that entrepreneurs 
score significantly higher in all three of these variables associated with being reflective. 
Specifically, my analysis indicated a significant main effect for being an entrepreneur on 
entrepreneurial alertness F(1, 170) 7.68, p < .01, the need for cognition F(1, 170) 5.62, p < .05, 
and scores on the cognitive reflections test F(1, 163) 10.13, p < .01. Regarding alertness, 
entrepreneurs rated themselves as higher on the alertness scale (M = 4.03) than non-
entrepreneurs (M = 3.77). Regarding the need for cognition, entrepreneurs rated themselves as 
higher on the need for cognition scale (M = 3.66) than non-entrepreneurs (M = 3.41). Lastly, 
regarding scores on the cognitive reflections test, entrepreneurs scored higher on the cognitive 
reflections test (M = 0.44) than non-entrepreneurs (M = 0.24). Thus, it appears that from a 
cognitive perspective, entrepreneurs may be more reflective than non-entrepreneurs. 
I analyzed the conditional indirect effect that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has 
on opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information based on whether on 
not the participant was an entrepreneur (had founded a business) using the PROCESS macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Consistent with my mixed findings in Study 1 and Study 2, based on a 90% 
confidence interval, bootstrapping results revealed that the indirect effect from the reliance on a 
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bias-causing heuristic to opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information 
was negative and significant for non-entrepreneurs (B =-.14, [-.2901,-.0070]) but not significant 
for entrepreneurs (B =-.01 [-.0971,.0842]).  
Taken together, the results of Study 1, Study 2 and the above post hoc analysis suggest 
that entrepreneurs may react differently to bias-causing heuristics during the opportunity 
recognition process than non-entrepreneurs because they are more reflective. To examine that, I 
further tested my general proposition that being reflective weakens the negative indirect effect 
that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has on opportunity recognition belief through the 
consideration of information using the combined samples. Specifically, I analyzed this 
conditional indirect effect based on variables associated with being reflective (entrepreneurial 
alertness, the need for cognition and scores on the cognitive reflections test) using the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013).  
Table 9 presents the results for these analyses. These results showed that this indirect 
effect is not conditional based on either of my hypothesized individual difference moderators 
(entrepreneurial alertness or the need for cognition). This indirect effect, however, was found to 
be conditional based on a 90% confidence interval regarding how reflective an individual is 
(assessed by the cognitive reflections test). Specifically, based on a 90% confidence interval, the 
indirect effect is negative and significant (B =.01, [ -.2339,-.0038]) for individuals who scored 
low on the cognitive reflections test and not significant (B =.03, [-.0789,.1438]) for individuals 
who scored high on the cognitive reflections test. 
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Discussion  
I found mixed support for the notion that bias-causing heuristics, in this case the betrayal 
heuristic, causes individuals to consider less information (Hypothesis 1). Specifically, this 
appears to be true for less-reflective individuals and non-entrepreneurs. I found consistent 
support for the notion that the consideration of information leads to forming the belief that one 
has recognized an opportunity (Hypothesis 2). Further, I found inconsistent results regarding the 
indirect relationship between the reliance on a bias-causing heuristics and forming the belief that 
one has recognized an opportunity through the consideration of information (Hypothesis 3: 
supported in Study 1, marginally supported in the pretest, but not in Study 2). These inconsistent 
findings appear to be a result of the samples chosen for each study (Study 1 = Adults, Study 2 = 
Entrepreneurs) and because this indirect effect is conditional on how reflective individuals are 
(based on the cognitive reflection test). I also proposed that the need for cognition (Hypothesis 4) 
and entrepreneurial alertness (Hypothesis 5) would capture how reflective individuals are and 
moderate this indirect effect, however, these hypotheses were not supported. Taken together, 
these results provide some support for the general notion that bias-causing heuristics may 
prevent less reflective individuals from recognizing an opportunity because they consider less 
information about the opportunity. More highly reflective individuals, however, are not as 
affected by these heuristics. 
Theoretical Implications 
 Prior literature suggests heuristics may be advantageous in regard to opportunity 
recognition (Baron, 2004; Baron & Ensley, 2006; Baron & Ward, 2004). In contrast, I show that 
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bias-causing heuristics can be detrimental to forming the belief that one has recognized an 
opportunity (at least in the case of betrayal aversion as the source of bias). My results suggest 
that these heuristics negatively affect the ability to recognize an opportunity through their 
influence on the amount of information that one considers. These results provide empirical 
support for McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) model of entrepreneurial action that suggests 
considering additional information reduces uncertainty, which enables individuals to form the 
belief that they have recognized an opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 
2007). 
 As would be expected based on dual process theories of cognition, the negative effect that 
heuristics have on the ability to recognize an opportunity through the consideration of 
information is conditional on how reflective an individual is. From a default-interventionist 
perspective, reflective individuals are better able to shift from their faster processing system to a 
more analytical cognitive process. I theorized that this ability to shift would allow reflective 
individuals to slow down, consider additional information about an opportunity, and thus be less 
negatively affected by bias-causing heuristics in regard to forming the belief that they 
recognition an opportunity. My results marginally support this relationship and suggest that 
being reflective may be important in the opportunity recognition process. My results also show 
that entrepreneurs tend to be more reflective. 
 It is interesting to note that although being reflective (as measured by the cognitive 
reflections test) is positively correlated with both the need for cognition and entrepreneurial 
alertness (see Table 7), neither of these individual differences moderated the indirect effect from 
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a bias-causing heuristic to opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of 
information. Although these individual differences are associated with being reflective, it does 
not appear as though alert or high need for cognition individuals are reflective enough to 
overcome bias-causing heurists (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Stanovich, 2009a). 
 Another interesting finding was that being an entrepreneur (founding a business) negated 
the negative indirect effect from a bias-causing heuristic to opportunity recognition belief 
through the consideration of information. This finding is likely because entrepreneurs are 
significantly more reflective than non-entrepreneurs. From an investigation of the means, 
however, it is worth noting that, on average, entrepreneurs considered less information and were 
less likely to form the belief that they recognized an opportunity than non-entrepreneurs in the 
non-heuristic condition. In the heuristic condition, however, entrepreneurs did not reduce the 
amount of information they considered and only reduced their level of opportunity recognition 
slightly. On the other hand, non-entrepreneurs reduced each by a larger margin such that 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs considered about the same amount of information and were 
equally likely to form the belief that they had recognized an opportunity when relying on a bias-
causing heuristic. A graphical representation is displayed in Figure 5.  
 This surprising finding may be in line with the idea that entrepreneurs focus on breadth 
(the number of opportunities they consider) and not depth (how much information they consider 
about each opportunity) when considering opportunities but are not as easily fooled by bias-
causing heuristics. That is, entrepreneurs (those who have been through the founding process) 
may realize the importance of not spending much time one any one opportunity so they have the 
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ability to examine many opportunities. It is also possible that entrepreneurs rely on personal 
knowledge and experience more so than external stimuli as compared to non-entrepreneurs. 
Thus, entrepreneurs may make up for not considering information by using information that they 
possess. If this is the case, it would be unknown whether bias-causing heuristics cause 
entrepreneurs to spend less time considering information that they already have. An alternative 
explanation may be that the experience of going through the founding process and realizing that 
many opportunities are not worth pursuing may make entrepreneurs harder to impress. Thus, 
entrepreneurs may be more hesitant to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity 
or to spend time considering one.  
 Overall, this study makes multiple contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. First, I 
show the potential negative effects of heuristics (specifically, the betrayal heuristic) on 
opportunity recognition and a process through which this relationship may work, the 
consideration of information. Second, I empirically show that considering additional information 
positively affects forming an opportunity recognition belief as proposed by McMullen and 
Shepherd’s (2006) conceptual model of entrepreneurial action. Third, I integrate dual process 
theories of cognition into the entrepreneurship literature and show that being reflective may be 
essential in the opportunity recognition process. Fourth, I empirically provide preliminary 
evidence that suggests entrepreneurs are more reflective in their cognitive processing style, more 
alert and have a higher need for cognition than non-entrepreneurs. Lastly, I empirically show that 
bias-causing heuristics do not affect entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in the same way. 
Specifically, I show that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic does not cause entrepreneurs but 
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does cause non-entrepreneurs to consider less information about an opportunity and as a result be 
less likely to form the belief that they have recognized that opportunity.     
Practical Implications  
This study also provides useful findings for entrepreneurs regarding the importance of 
information when considering the existence of an opportunity. That is, my results show that 
entrepreneurs tend to consider less information about a potential opportunity and that considering 
information about a potential opportunity is positively related to forming the belief that an actual 
opportunity does or does not exist. This belief is a prerequisite to determining if that opportunity 
is for the entrepreneur himself or herself. Although considering less information about a potential 
opportunity may be beneficial in some circumstances because it allows for more time to consider 
additional opportunities, it can also lead to the missing out on a great opportunity. Thus, current 
entrepreneurs should be aware that their tendency to consider less information about a potential 
opportunity could have serious implications such as missing out on the next great opportunity. 
This study also provides useful findings for potential entrepreneurs and entrepreneur educators. 
Specifically, although would-be entrepreneurs are often told to follow their gut regarding 
recognizing opportunities, their immediate reactions may not always be the best ones. Certainly, 
quick decisions may benefit entrepreneurs, particularly seasoned entrepreneurs, by allowing 
them to consider many opportunities. My results, however, suggest that seasoned 
entrepreneurs—perhaps because they are more reflective in their cognitive processing style—are 
less negatively affected than would-be entrepreneurs by bias-causing heuristics. Thus, would-be 
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entrepreneurs should be especially careful not to over-rely on their gut but to realize the 
importance of honing their ability to be reflective when searching for opportunities.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions 
My study has multiple strengths. Specifically, the experimental causal chain design that I 
used for Study 1 allows me to isolate my variables of interest and make strong inferences about 
the causal path of the hypothesized relationship. Further, using the application of a real 
technology being applied to the market that it was actually applied to helps with the 
generalizability of my theorizing. Further, using a sample of actual entrepreneurs also 
strengthens the generalizability of my findings and allows me to consider important differences 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
My study, however, is not without limitations. To begin with, my sample for Study 1 was 
small; however, I did find the hypothesized relationships to be significant, and these results were 
replicated in the pretest with a sample of 201 participants. Further, my studies only provide a 
small glimpse into this very complicated opportunity recognition process. Specifically, 
throughout all of my analyses, I only used one bias-causing heuristics manipulation (i.e., the 
betrayal heuristic). Although I tactically chose this manipulation after multiple pretests, the use 
of one heuristic limits the generalizability of my findings, as other bias-causing heuristics may 
have a different effect on the consideration of information and the formation of an opportunity 
recognition belief. Beyond this, by only examining bias-causing heuristics, I limit myself to only 
considering one side of the coin. That is, I do not investigate the possible benefits of accurate 
heuristics on the consideration of information and the formation of an opportunity recognition 
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belief. Further, I only allowed individuals to collect up to five pieces of information, which may 
limit my ability to fully understand these relationships. That is, the nature of the relationship 
between information and opportunity recognition may change, as more information is available. 
Additionally, I only presented individuals with one technology/market combination that had 
previously been exploited and, as such, should have been rated high in regard to opportunity 
recognition belief. The relationship between bias-causing heuristics and both the consideration of 
information and opportunity recognition belief, however, may be different for non-exploited, 
poorly matched opportunities. Further, although the experimental design of Study 1 strengthens 
this research, it also limits the generalizability of my findings, which was exemplified by the 
inconsistent results in Study 2.  
The unexpected findings and above noted limitations, however, provide interesting 
avenues for future research. Specifically, I suggest the effect of bias-causing heuristics should be 
explored in a sample of both would-be and current entrepreneurs. Further, the effect of 
alternative bias-causing heuristics should also be explored. Beyond that, the interesting finding 
that entrepreneurs may consider less information generally, and more importantly may be less 
likely to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity, should be explored. 
Specifically, I suggest considering how entrepreneurs, as compared to non-entrepreneurs, trade 
off between breadth (the number of opportunities explored) and depth (how much information is 
explored about each opportunity) when considering opportunities.  
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Conclusion 
This study sheds light on the potential negatives of fast thinking and the benefits of 
considering information to would-be entrepreneurs. Seasoned entrepreneurs may trade off the 
depth of their search for greater breadth in their search, with little or no consequences. Seeing 
seasoned entrepreneurs’ successes may cause would be entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship 
educators alike to advocate this type of fast thinking shallow search. Seasoned entrepreneurs, 
however, appear to use different cognitive processes that allow them to be successful when using 
this approach. Thus, would-be entrepreneurs should be cautious when relying on fast thinking 
during the opportunity recognition process.  
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Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations for Study 1 and Study 2 
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Table 2 Poisson Regression Results for Collection 1 of Study 1 
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Table 3 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for Collection 1 of Study 1 
 
 
 
  
66 
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Table 4 Regression Results for Collection 2 of Study 1 
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ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
COLLECTION 1 OF STUDY 1 
  
69 
 
Table 5 Alternative Regression Analysis Results for Collection 1 of Study 1 
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Table 6 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for Study 2 
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Table 7 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations for the Post Hoc Sample 
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Table 8 Post Hoc ANOVA Results for Being an Entrepreneur on Reflective Outcomes 
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APPENDIX I:  
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Table 9 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for the Post Hoc Analysis 
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model 
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APPENDIX K:  
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATING AND DEPENDENT 
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Figure 2 Distribution of Moderating and Dependent Variable for Collection 1 of Study 1 
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APPENDIX L:  
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR 
COLLECTION 2 OF STUDY 1 
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Figure 3 Distribution of Dependent Variable for Collection 2  of Study 1 
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APPENDIX M: 
FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATING AND DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE FOR STUDY 2 
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Figure 4 Distribution of Moderating and Dependent Variable for Study 2 
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APPENDIX N:  
FIGURE 5: MEAN COMPARISON OF FOUNDER AND NON-FOUNDER 
ON RECOGNITION/INFORMATION COLLECTED 
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APPENDIX O: BIAS-CAUSING HEURISTICS
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Type of Heuristic  Definition  Example(s) 
Availability 
Heuristic 
When one estimate of probabilities or 
frequencies is based on the ease to which 
something comes to mind (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). 
 People overestimate the possibility of deaths due to 
dramatic events such as tornadoes (Sutherland, 2007). 
 Managers’ reactions to HR procedures are based on 
the availability of their experiences with the HR 
system (Taylor, Masterson, Renard, & Tracy 1998). 
 Managers base performance appraisals on more vivid 
or recent acts (Bazerman & Moore, 2012). 
 Managers base perceptions of environmental 
uncertainty on the availability heuristic (Ireland, Hitt, 
Bettis, Porras, & Auld, 1987). 
 Participants estimate the frequency of seven- letter 
words with the sixth letter “n” to be lower than the 
frequency of seven-letter words ending in “ing” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Representativeness 
Heuristic 
When one estimates probabilities about 
something because it is very similar to a 
prototype of that category (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1974). 
 
 Patients ignore base rates and believe that a positive 
result for a test that is 99% accurate at diagnosing a 
disease that only occurs in 1 out of 10,000 people in 
the population means that there is a 99% chance that 
they have they disease when there is really only a 1% 
chance that they have the disease (Axelsson, 2000). 
 Entrepreneurs ignoring base rates of business failure 
in difficult markets (Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma, 2007). 
 Individuals are insensitive to the sample size when 
determining how likely it would be for the percentage 
of male births on any given day to differ from the 
mean percentage of male births in a small hospital 
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where there are few births each day compared to a 
large hospital where there are many (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). 
 Individuals expect sequences of random events to 
appear random and as such judge the likelihood of a 
sequence of events such as coin flips that appear to be 
less likely (e.g., people judge coin flip pattern 1 
(HTHTHT) as less likely than pattern 2 (HTHHHTT) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
 Based on the conjunction fallacy, individuals assume 
that the probability of multiple conditions is more 
likely than the probability of one of those conditions 
(see my discussion of the Linda problem) (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). 
Confirmation 
Heuristic 
The tendency to seek and interpret 
information that supports an individual’s 
belief or expectation (Nickerson, 1998). 
 
 
 (Confirmation Trap) Individuals with conservative 
political views tend to seek out conservative pundits, 
such as Sean Hannity, and individuals with liberal 
political views tend to seek out liberal pundits such as 
Bill Maher (Bazerman & Moore, 2012). 
 (Confirmation Trap) When given information about the 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the death penalty 
deterring crime, those who supported the death 
penalty found information suggesting that it was 
effective to be credible and found reasons to disregard 
the information suggesting it was ineffective. Whereas 
the opposite happened for people that did not 
support the use of a death penalty (Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979). 
 (Anchoring) Randomly generated numbers affecting 
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individuals’ estimates of the number of African 
countries belonging to the UN (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1974). 
 (Anchoring) Positive first impressions by an 
interviewer leading to an interview behavior more 
likely to confirm that belief (e.g. selling of the 
company during the interview, collecting less 
information from the applicant) (Dougherty, Turban, & 
Callender, 1994). 
 (Hindsight) Believing that one would correctly assess 
the outcome of a battle that they were (truthfully or 
falsely) told an outcome of, if they had not known the 
outcome. Results showed that no matter what 
outcome (the true or false outcome) people were told, 
they believed that was the outcome they would have 
picked had they not been told any information 
(Fischhoff, 1975).  
Affect Heuristic Relying on one’s affective state when 
making a judgment (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).  
 A CIO of a large financial firm investing tens of millions 
of dollars in a company because he liked the firm 
(Kahneman, 2011). 
 Attractive entrepreneurs and their ideas being rated 
more favorably due to an increase in affect of the 
evaluator (Baron, Markman, & Bollinger, 2006). 
Outrage Heuristic When determining punishment, people 
consider the outrageousness of a crime 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
 
 People punish legally identical crimes differently (e.g., 
the robbery of a child being punished more than the 
robbery of an adult) (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
Betrayal Heuristic In making judgments one punishes and 
does not reward betrayals of trust 
 Choosing not to purchase the overall safer of two cars 
because the safer car is equipped with an air bag (i.e., 
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(Sunstein, 2005). a safety device) that betrays the people it is supposed 
to protect and causes death (Koehler & Gershoff, 
2003). 
 Choosing to punish identical crimes differently when 
they betray a trust (e.g., a bank robbery by a bank 
security guard being punished more than a bank 
robbery by a taxi cab driver) (Koehler & Gershoff 
2003). 
Effort Heuristic When quality judgments are based on the 
evaluators’ perception of the amount of 
effort that was put into creating the thing 
being evaluated (Kruger, Wirtz,Van Boven, 
& Altermatt, 2004). 
 Rating the same painting as being of higher quality 
because it took more time to create (Kruger et al., 
2004). 
Scarcity Heuristic When things are valued based on how 
easily they are to obtain (or lost) (Cialdini, 
1988). 
 People finding a new appreciation for life after a near 
death experience (King, Hicks, & Abdelkhalik, 2009). 
 Job candidates believing that jobs with fewer openings 
paid a higher wage than jobs with more openings 
(Highhouse, Beadle, Gallo, & Miller, 1998). 
Simulation 
Heuristic 
When the ease to which one can create a 
mental construction of an imagined reality 
determines how likely they believe it is to 
happen (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
 The more easily patients could picture a negative 
event, the more likely they believed that event was 
going to happen to them (Raune, MacLeod, & Holmes, 
2005). 
 The ease to which one could imagine a weather 
disaster related to how likely they believe it is that 
disaster would occur (Greening, Dollinger, & Pitz, 
1996). 
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Cite  Theoretical/ 
Empirical 
Heuristic/s  Relevant findings/propositions  
Baron, R. A. (1998) Theoretical  Affect heuristic  
Self-serving bias  
Planning fallacy 
 
 Entrepreneurs may be more susceptible to 
the affect heuristic which can lead to 
serious errors in judgment. 
 Entrepreneurs may be more susceptible to 
the self-serving bias that can lead to 
overconfidence and interpersonal friction. 
Successful entrepreneurs, however, may 
be less susceptible to the self-serving bias 
than less successful entrepreneurs. 
 Entrepreneurs may be more susceptible to 
the planning fallacy that can lead to 
unrealistic timetables.   
Baron, R. A. (2004) Theoretical Styles of cognitive processing   Entrepreneurs may be prone to using 
heuristic type processing. 
 Successful entrepreneurs may be 
particularly able to switch from their 
heuristic based processing system to their 
slower cognitive process and such have 
particularly effective heuristics. 
 Successful entrepreneurs may be less 
susceptible to biases that lead to poor 
decisions than less successful 
entrepreneurs.   
Baron, R. A. (2006) Theoretical Prototype heuristic   Prototypes may allow entrepreneurs to 
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see patterns in what seem to be unrelated 
things and such may be beneficial in 
regard to recognizing opportunities. 
Baron, R. A., & Ensley, M. D. 
(2006) 
Empirical Prototype heuristic   Experienced entrepreneurs have more 
clearly defined mental prototypes of 
opportunities than less experienced 
entrepreneurs. Further, experienced 
entrepreneurs’ mental prototypes are 
richer in context and focus more on 
realizing financial gain than less 
experienced entrepreneurs.  
Baron, R. A., & Ward, T. B. 
(2004) 
Theoretical Styles of cognitive processing  Entrepreneurs are not immune from 
cognitive biases. 
 Entrepreneurs’ preference for heuristic 
based thinking and their ability to switch 
back and forth between their fast and slow 
cognitive processing system should be 
explored. 
Burmeister, K., & Schade, C. 
(2007). 
Empirical Status quo heuristic  Entrepreneurs were no more biased than 
other groups.  Specifically, entrepreneurs 
were equally as biased by the status quo 
heuristic as students but less affected by 
the status quo heuristic than bankers.  
Busenitz, L. W. (1999) Empirical  Representativeness 
Overconfidence  
 Entrepreneurs were found to be more 
likely to use the representativeness 
heuristic and be more overconfident than 
managers in large organizations. 
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 These results suggest that entrepreneurs 
deal with risky situations in a different way 
than managers.  
Busenitz, L. W., & Barney, J. B. 
(1997) 
Empirical Representativeness 
Overconfidence 
 Entrepreneurs were found to be more 
likely to use the representativeness 
heuristic and be more overconfident than 
managers in large organizations. 
 Individuals most susceptible to heuristics 
may be the type of people who are most 
likely to become entrepreneurs. 
Cooper, A. C., Woo, C. Y., & 
Dunkelberg, W. C. (1988) 
Empirical Overconfidence  Both well-prepared and poorly prepared 
entrepreneurs were found to be 
overconfident when considering the 
potential for success of their business.  
Forbes, D. P. (2005). Empirical Overconfidence  Different types of entrepreneurs display 
different degrees of overconfidence.   
 New venture founder-managers were 
found to be more overconfident than new 
venture non-founder managers. 
 Younger entrepreneurs were found to be 
more overconfident than older 
entrepreneurs. 
 Entrepreneurs in smaller and younger 
ventures were found to be more 
overconfident than entrepreneurs in larger 
and older ventures. 
Shepherd, D. A., Haynie, J. M., Theoretical Confirmatory search strategy  Confirmatory search strategy may be a 
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& McMullen, J. S. (2012). useful heuristic for entrepreneurs when 
considering opportunities. 
Simon, M., Houghton, S. M., 
& Aquino, K. (2000). 
Empirical Overconfidence 
Illusion of control  
Belief in small numbers 
 MBA students who scored more highly in 
the illusion of control or the belief in small 
numbers perceived less risk regarding a 
potential venture and such were more 
willing to pursue it. 
Ucbasaran, D., Westhead, P., 
& Wright, M. (2009). 
Empirical  Heuristics and information 
search  
 The use of heuristics may lead 
entrepreneurs to consider less information 
regarding opportunities which allows them 
to consider more opportunities in a given 
time period. This assertion was not 
supported.  
Zahra, S. A., Korri, J. S., & Yu, 
J. (2005) 
Theoretical Heuristics and international 
opportunity recognition  
 Past experience may enable entrepreneurs 
to develop heuristics that allow them to 
understand situations quickly. This may 
explain why entrepreneurs consider some 
venture ideas and ignore others in 
international markets. 
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Low Information Condition High Information Condition 
Researchers at a large university created low-temperature oxidation catalyst filters to convert carbon 
monoxide to nontoxic carbon dioxide. The inventors of this technology did not want to personally 
pursue business opportunities because they are purely scientists. This technology is now part of a 
university’s technology transfer program that makes the technology available for a licensing deal with a 
new or existing firm. One possible market that researchers suggested this technology could be applied 
to is the fire safety and protection market through a personal rescue hood. The university technology 
transfer office has done some research related to the application of the technology to this market. We 
are asking you as a potential entrepreneur to evaluate this potential opportunity. On the next page we 
provide you with the executive summary about the opportunity. Please carefully consider all of the 
information provided. 
Executive Summary 
General Information:    There is a 5% chance 
that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed 
due to smoke inhalation. Scientific tests 
indicate, however, that there is only a 1.5% 
chance of death due to smoke inhalation when a 
personal rescue hood is used. The rescue hood, 
however, could also cause minor side effects 
such as a temporary rash.       
 
Risk Analysis:  State and Federal law is clear 
that manufacturers, producers, distributors and 
retailers of fire safety equipment are not legally 
culpable for death or injures when the overall 
effect of the safety equipment results in a 
decrease in death from fire. That is, if a 
customer is injured or dies from using a fire 
safety hood they can not sue. 
Executive Summary 
General Information:    There is a 5% chance that 
homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to 
smoke inhalation. Scientific tests indicate, however, 
that there is only a 1.5% chance of death due to 
smoke inhalation when a personal rescue hood is 
used. The rescue hood, however, could also cause 
minor side effects such as a temporary rash.       
 
Risk Analysis:  State and Federal law is clear that 
manufacturers, producers, distributors and retailers 
of fire safety equipment are not legally culpable for 
death or injures when the overall effect of the safety 
equipment results in a decrease in death from fire. 
That is, if a customer is injured or dies from using a 
fire safety hood they can not sue. 
 
Distribution:  This type of product could be used 
during emergencies at home, work, and school, as 
well as for professional firefighting and rescue 
efforts. The home fire safety market was responsible 
for over 6 billion dollars in revenue last year 
alone.    
    
Market Validation:  Preliminary market research 
has shown that homeowners are overwhelmingly 
interested in a product like this. Specifically, a poll 
of 5,000 consumers showed 90 percent would be 
interested in purchasing this type of product at $40 
per hood. 
  
100 
 
APPENDIX R: BOTH MANIPULATIONS 
  
101 
 
Manipulation used in Study 1 and Study 2 Earlier Manipulation Used in pretest 
No Betrayal Condition 
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire 
will be killed due to smoke inhalation. Scientific tests 
indicate, however, that there is only a 1.5% chance of 
death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue 
hood is used. The rescue hood, however, could also 
cause minor side effects such as a temporary rash.  
 
Smoke inhalation from noxious products of fire 
combustion is the number one cause of death related 
to home and work fires. A personal rescue hood, 
incorporating a filtration system that utilizes a low-
temperature oxidation catalyst, would reduce smoke 
inhalation death by 10%. The hood, however, could 
also cause minor side effects such as a temporary 
rash.    
Betrayal Condition 
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire 
will be killed due to smoke inhalation. Scientific tests 
indicate, however, that there is only a 1% chance of 
death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue 
hood is used. The rescue hood, however, may also kill 
some homeowners. Specifically, some rescue hood users 
may die due to hood suffocation caused by the hood 
itself. Tests indicate that there is an additional one 
chance in 200 (0.5%) that someone who is in a serious 
fire, who uses the rescue hood, will be killed due to hood 
suffocation.  
Smoke inhalation from noxious products of fire 
combustion is the number one cause of death related 
to home and work fires. A personal rescue hood, 
incorporating a filtration system that utilizes a low-
temperature oxidation catalyst, would reduce smoke 
inhalation death by 20%. The hood, however, would 
also kill, due to suffocation from the hood itself, one 
half (50%) of the people who would have otherwise 
died from smoke inhalation. 
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Researchers at a large university created low-temperature oxidation catalyst filters to convert carbon monoxide to 
nontoxic carbon dioxide. This technology is now part of a university’s technology transfer program that makes 
the technology available for a licensing deal with a new or existing firm. One possible market that researchers 
suggested this technology could be applied to is the fire safety and protection market through a personal 
protection hood. The university technology transfer office has created two prototype personal protection hoods 
(Hood A and Hood B). They are identical in regard to cost, price, production time and so on. Please consider the 
below and which prototype Hood A or Hood B you would be more interested in licensing as a potential 
entrepreneur.    
 
Statistics indicate that there is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to smoke 
inhalation. Scientific tests indicate that there is only a 2% chance that homeowners that use Hood A in a serious 
fire will be killed due to smoke inhalation from the fire. These tests also indicate that there is only a 1% chance 
that homeowners that use Hood B in a serious fire will die due to smoke inhalation. However, Hood B may kill 
homeowners who would not have died if they were using Hood A. Specifically, some Hood B users may die due 
to hood suffocation caused by the hood itself. Tests indicate that there is an additional one chance in 200 (0.5%) 
that someone who is in a serious fire who uses Hood B will be killed due to hood suffocation.  
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APPENDIX T: COGNITIVE REFLECTIONS TEST QUESTIONS 
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1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ____Cents 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? ____Minutes 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? ____days 
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i
 It in notable that authors such as Gerd Gigerenzer and Ralph Hertwig have criticized the Linda problem based on 
its wording, however, similar results have been found in many follow-up studies including collaborations between 
Kahnemen and Hertwig (Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D., 2001). 
ii
 I fully concede that from a default-interventionist perspective, errors could also occur because the analytical 
system affirms an inaccurate judgment by the heuristic systems error or even because the analytical system overrides 
a correct judgment by the heuristic system. I only suggest errors are most likely when the analytical system does not 
intervene to correct a heuristic-based error 
iii
 An alternative way to test Hypothesis 1 would be to use the log of the amount of information considered as the 
dependent variable in a standard regression (Delmar & Shane 2006). Thus, I also followed this procedure, which 
further supported my predictions in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, regression analyses revealed a negative relationship 
between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic (the betrayal condition) and the log of the amount of information 
considered ( = -.458, p < .05, ∆R2=.10*). Results are presented in Table 5 
iv
 A major limitation of collection 1 of Study 1 is the sample size (n = 55). It should be noted, however, that these 
findings were replicated, using a 90% bootstrapped confidence interval, using the earlier version of the manipulation 
provided in Appendix M with a sample of 270 student and non-student participants.  
